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Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to defend the notion of character from concerns 
raised recently by situationists (namely, John Doris & Gilbert Harman). Situationism 
attempts to undermine the concept o f character used to support most versions of 
virtue ethics by appealing to research in the social sciences. More specifically, both 
John Doris and Gilbert Harman are global character trait eliminativists who take the 
social-psychological research to warrant the abandonment of the concept o f character. 
This thesis draws heavily upon the mental space mapping theory known as conceptual 
blending developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. I make use o f the insights 
provided by conceptual blending theory in an attempt to disarm the situationists’ 
character eliminativist position by showing how entrenched and useful is the notion 
of character to our common understandings and interpretations o f ourselves and 
others.
iii
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1.0 Introduction
Perhaps one o f the most well known cases in which we are likely to make 
ascriptions o f character is when we are first introduced to someone we have never 
met before— an event so well recognized and generally treated as bearing such a great 
deal of importance that it has become commonly known as ‘the first impression’. 
Indeed, this catch phrase betrays our tendency to make such character ascriptions.
The word ‘impression’, in the notion of ‘the first impression’, suggests that the 
fundamental aspects o f a lasting image of the type o f character or personality that one 
is believed to have are decided in the mind of the other in these moments. This is not 
to say that these rapid ascriptions based on limited and typically not altogether 
truthful personal information are always accurate. In fact, there are many reasons to 
think that such ascriptions are more often erroneous than not; people tend to want to 
emphasize their positive attributes and downplay their shortcomings when first being 
introduced to others— a tendency that has earned a couple o f catch phrases o f its own, 
such as, ‘putting your best foot forward,’ and ‘putting on your best face’. However, 
the tendency to make character attributions seems to persist, even in the face o f what 
must often turn out to be false ascriptions. Indeed, it is not all that uncommon to hear 
statements like, “I got a bad vibe from him” or, “There’s something not quite right 
with that one,” in common parlance. What these kinds of generally vague statements 
are intended to imply is something more specific about the character o f the person 
commented upon; for example, in reference to the two common statements above, 
what is implied is that the individual is untrustworthy, dishonest, or even dangerous.
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We seem to rely upon these rapid character ascriptions to mediate our modes of 
interaction with one another. Positive ascriptions seem to allow for a sense o f comfort 
when in the presence o f the other, and they may encourage a continued interaction, 
while negative ascriptions, on the other hand, signal the need for caution in dealing 
with the individual and often seem to encourage a policy of avoidance.
We even make character ascriptions about people we have never actually met. 
Perhaps even more surprising is that such ascriptions are often based solely on 
appearances— and even these may be the handiwork of advertising and marketing 
firms. For example, we may come to see a candidate who is vying for office as having 
an indecisive type o f character based solely on the suggestions o f the political 
campaign messages o f his or her challenger which state that the candidate has been 
known to ‘flip-flop’ on important issues. This is perhaps why political ‘smear’ 
campaigns are so pervasive; once the image we hold o f a candidate’s character is 
created, or tarnished, it is hard to imagine that they would behave in any other way 
than what would typically be expected o f someone with such a character. What this 
and the ‘first impression’ example have in common is a particular understanding of 
the notion o f character. It is an understanding that character is relatively stable and 
consistent. In other words, once we make a character ascription, we assume that there 
will be little if  any change in the characteristic behaviour we would expect to see 
from the person given the type o f character that they were ascribed. That is to say, 
once we make a character judgment, it seems to stick. So the indecisive politician is 
still considered to have an indecisive kind of character, and is expected to remain 
unsure of his or her decisions, even when it is quite clear that he or she is resolutely
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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advocating a particular position on some issue, so long as our awareness o f their 
decisiveness comes after the original character attribution o f ‘indecisiveness’ was 
made. Also, one may continue to feel uncomfortable around another individual from 
whom they received a ‘bad vibe,’ regardless o f whether or not any cogent reason for 
such uneasiness has been observed in subsequent interactions. What these two 
introductory examples were intended to convey is both that the attribution and 
assessment o f character or personality is a very common practice, and that the 
concept of character most commonly employed in such processes is one that takes 
character to be a stable and enduring phenomenon. But, one might ask, “How did we 
come to think o f character in this way?”
Our modem notions of personality and character have been deeply influenced 
by a tradition that dates back to the writings o f Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle developed a theory o f morality in which the idea o f virtue was intimately 
connected with a particular understanding o f character—one not unlike the current 
common view. Indeed, in his ethical treatise, Aristotle (Kaplan [Ed.], 1958) suggested 
that, “[Virtuous] action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character”
(p. 187). However, there are certain other conditions o f the agent that Aristotle 
thought also needed to be met in order for one’s action to be considered morally just 
or temperate— independently o f whether or not the action issued from a ‘firm and 
unchanging character.’ These additional conditions were that the agent must have 
knowledge (presumably about what is the morally appropriate action to take), must 
choose the acts, and the acts must be chosen for their own sakes (p. 187). These 
additional conditions can be considered deeply relevant to the notion o f virtue, and as
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such, they may pose a serious problem for the position I will argue against; however, 
since they are not crucial to the notion of the stability of character that I am currently 
attempting to illustrate, these considerations and other details o f Aristotle’s ethical 
theory will be postponed for the time being. What is important here is that it be 
recognized that Aristotle’s view of character as something that is ‘firm and 
unchanging’ has come to be the dominant view o f character in modem times.
The view that character is relatively stable and enduring has been responsible 
for many o f the assumptions that underlie various psychological personality theories 
and research programs, as well as moral theorizing, and educational planning. For 
psychological personality theories, such as trait theory, and the Jungian typology, the 
notion of the relative stability o f character or personality (treated as synonymous in 
this thesis), is central. In fact, without such a notion, these and similar theories would 
lack internal coherence. Also, in regards to moral theory, the idea o f character and its 
stability can be seen to play an important role in virtually any theory o f virtue ethics 
since the time of Aristotle. Moreover, ideas about how to develop virtuous character 
dispositions in children have played a significant role in shaping educational practices 
and policies. These practices and policies, had they not taken for granted that the 
types o f character dispositions that they were designed to promote were enduring, 
would have likely diverted resources to more promising proposals for behavioural 
regulation. I mention these last three areas o f human endeavour with the intent to 
convey just how deeply imbedded within our culture is the traditional Aristotelian 
notion of the stability and permanence of character; indeed, that this notion does not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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only inform our modes o f thinking about individuals, but that it also shapes important 
social practices as well.
Nevertheless, that a particular view may be widely held does not guarantee its 
accuracy. In at least some cases, neither how deeply a part o f the common 
understanding a notion may be, nor how many practical activities are dependant upon 
or influenced by such a notion, can testify to the accuracy o f the conception. For 
example, it was once believed that the Earth was flat, and this notion was widely 
accepted as being accurate since it was coherent with the general intuitions and 
assumptions derived from normal visual perception. Also, it is not difficult to imagine 
that the notion of the world’s flatness likely influenced sailing and fishing practices, 
as one would not want to fall off the edge o f the Earth. However, as time and 
scientific advancements would show, the world is in fact not flat— and no amount of 
people who continued to think that it was, nor sailor’s who would avoid the supposed 
edge, could change that fact. In a similar vein, there are philosophers and 
psychologists in the present era who are beginning to think that the traditional notion 
of character, despite its common acceptance and cultural imbeddedness, will likely 
share the same fate as the notion o f the flat Earth; that is, it will be shown to be 
obsolete.
Two o f the more notable philosophers to take on the view that the traditional 
notions of character are inaccurate are John Doris and Gilbert Harman. According to 
Doris and Harman (D&H), recent experiments within social psychology undermine 
the traditional concept of character; consequently, they support the view that it is in 
fact the situational context that is most responsible for the types o f behaviours that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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people display. They suggest that the results obtained in experiments designed to 
study obedience and other forms of situationally contingent behaviour should 
encourage us not simply to re-evaluate the traditional Aristotelian view o f character— 
one that they suggest is committed to robust and persistent personality or character 
traits1—but to abandon it in favor o f what they consider to be a more empirically 
informed understanding o f the determinants o f behaviour, namely, situational factors. 
Indeed, in regards to traditional notions o f character, Doris claims, “I am— at least in 
some attenuated sense— advocating their elimination” (2002, p. 108). Echoing Doris, 
is Harman’s more spirited statement that, “We need to abandon all talk [and thought] 
of virtue and character, not find a way to save it by reinterpreting it” (2000b, p. 224).
The view endorsed by both D&H has come to be known as situationism. 
Although there may be varying degrees o f commitment to the position that behaviour 
is primarily situationally motivated— for example, Doris’ account allows for what he 
calls ‘local character traits’, while Harman makes no such provision—they are at base 
united by the view that the traditional conception of character, in terms o f global 
traits, is flawed and inaccurate, and that it ought to be replaced by an account of, and 
an appreciation for, the situational context. According to Doris, the global view of 
character traits is committed to idea that, “character and personality traits are reliably 
manifested [in a temporally stable manner] in trait-relevant behavior across a 
diversity o f trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their
' According to G.W. Allport, a trait refers to “a certain definite conception o f  a generalized response- 
unit in which resides the distinctive quality o f  behavior that reflects personality” (1931, p. 368). He 
later, defines a trait as: “a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli 
functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms o f  
adaptive and expressive behaviour” (as cited in Hergenhahn, Olson & Cramer, p. 159). In short, a trait 
is responsible for an individual’s behaving in a similar manner when faced with similar situational 
contexts.
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conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question” (2002, p. 22). He takes 
local traits, on the other hand, to refer to “closely circumscribed evaluative 
attributions” of behaviour that display predictive efficacy in only “narrowly specified 
domains”. In other words, for a trait to be considered global (or robust) it must 
motivate a certain type o f behavioural response across various situations, while local 
traits need only to motivate a specific behavioural response in very specific contexts. 
For example, one might possess the local trait of “defends-family-and-friends 
courage” while being an utter coward when it comes to asking someone out on a date; 
whereas, if  one were in possession o f a global trait of courage, they would display the 
courage to defend their family and friends, ask a person out on a date, sky-dive, and a 
multitude of other character-relevant behaviours across a vast range of appropriate 
eliciting conditions.
For both D&H, the attempt to undermine character acts as the base from 
which they attempt to discredit virtue ethics. Since they suggest that the ethical theory 
they are challenging depends upon a robust notion of character, if  they can 
successfully undermine the view o f character that motivates the theory, they will, by 
extension, undermine the ethical theory as well. As a result, if  left unchallenged, their 
work could have serious negative implications for, among other things, our notions of 
responsibility, praise and blame, the practice o f law, and concepts o f self. In response 
to the potential negative implications o f their shared position, I will expose some of 
the weaknesses o f their attempt to undermine global character, and I will also 
challenge the view that the concept of character ought to be abandoned. However, I 
will, for the most part, not argue in favour of any kind of virtue ethics. If I can
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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adequately defend the notion of character, then I should have also, at least indirectly, 
allowed for the possibility of some kind o f theory o f virtue. Not to mention, as will be 
seen in section 2.2 and 2.5, others have already argued fairly persuasively for the 
preservation o f virtue based ethical theory.
However, before commenting upon my own position in any greater detail, I 
will first consider the position o f both D&H, and examine some o f the more 
impressive experiments that they have marshaled in support o f their contentions. As 
will be shown, these social-psychological experiments have obtained some rather 
striking and, perhaps to some, counterintuitive results. That these results often appear 
to conflict with popular intuitions is a point that D&H consider to lend support to 
their position; that is, because D&H think that the standard view of character is false, 
for them, it makes sense that normal attempts to make character based predictions 
would not be borne out by the experimental data. This is why they both make mention 
o f the psychological literature and experimental research on ‘the fundamental 
attribution error’2 within their arguments; although these experiments do not 
straightforwardly count against the notion o f character, what they do highlight is our 
implicit tendency to make character based ascriptions erroneously. That is, by 
typically undervaluing the situational context, they count against the usefulness and 
reliability o f such character based behavioural ascriptions and predictions.
2 The fundamental attribution error refers to the common tendency to explain an individual’s behaviour 
in terms o f  personality or dispositions as opposed to relying on situational explanations (especially 
where such behaviours can be shown to be due to the situation). For a more extensive treatment o f  the 
fundamental attribution error, see L. Ross (1977).
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1.1 The Case for Situationism
Although there are various psychological experiments from which the results 
may be taken and construed as providing suggestive evidence against character, I will 
focus on several frequently employed and stirring examples found within the 
situationist literature. These examples, I suggest, should be sufficient to provide an 
understanding o f the situationist argument, as well as some o f the reasons motivating 
the development of such a position. These examples, perhaps unexpectedly, are 
separately composed of such diverse elements as finding a dime, seminary students, 
and the administration o f electrical shocks. In what follows, I will present these 
creative experiments as well as D&H’s interpretative appraisals o f their results in as 
favourable a light as possible. And later, in chapter two, I will move to an 
examination o f some of the responses and critiques o f the position and interpretations 
provided by D&H. The presentation o f the critical and alternative positions will be 
followed by (in chapter three) what I consider to be a novel approach to challenging 
the situationist position that I will develop by using the conceptual blending theory of 
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. To close (in chapter four), I will present some 
reflections upon the notion of character inspired by Daniel Dennett’s views on the 
‘self, followed by the conclusion (chapter four) and suggestions for future theorizing 
and research.
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1.2 Dispositions vs. Dimes
The first experiment to be reviewed is the Isen and Levin (1972) study 
regarding mood effects on prosocial (i.e. helping) behaviour. This study examined the 
differences in helping behaviour between two groups that were only experimentally 
differentiated by one o f the group’s oblivious participants having found a dime in the 
coin return slot o f the telephone they had just used, while the other group did not find 
a coin. After an unwitting participant finished using the telephone (either finding a 
coin in the return slot or not), an experimental confederate would walk by and pretend 
to accidentally drop a folder filled with papers. Those participants who stopped to 
assist the confederate with the papers were considered to behave in a helpful way, 
while those who did not assist the confederate were considered not to have behaved in 
a helpful manner. Perhaps surprisingly, o f those who found a dime prior to the 
confederate’s mishap, fourteen stopped to help while two did not; and o f those who 
did not find a dime, one individual helped and twenty-four did not. So, while we may 
think that the individual’s likelihood to help gather the papers is based upon their 
character disposition to such behaviour (i.e. their helpful or compassionate character), 
the experimental data suggests that it would be more accurate to attribute such 
behaviours to an environmental (read: situational) factor as apparently trivial as 
having found a dime. That is to say that, though we may assume, in a thought 
experiment, that Jack, the self-absorbed, ego-centric male model would be highly 
unlikely to help; while Jill, the nursing home volunteer would almost certainly rush to 
lend a hand; what the experimental results reveal is that, in this case, not only do the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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character conceptions evoked by such prototypes have negligible import in regards to 
predicting the relevant behaviour, but that something as seemingly inconsequential as 
finding a dime can actually make the difference between an individual’s helping or 
not helping. So, if  the Jack of our thought experiment finds the dime, the actual data 
suggests that he will be much more likely to help than Jill will be if she does not find 
a dime.
According to Doris, what makes these kinds o f experiments so remarkable is, 
“that seemingly insubstantial situational factors have substantial effects on what 
people do” (2002, p. 28). Indeed, what is at issue is not, as many would concede, that 
forceful or demanding situational pressures influence behaviours, but that seemingly 
trivial aspects o f one’s day to day environment can have a significant impact upon 
what attitudes, behaviours, and actions one is likely to express. This has led Doris to 
claim that, “the disproportionate impact o f these ‘insubstantial’ situational factors 
presses charges o f empirical inadequacy against characterological moral psychology” 
(2002, p. 28). In other words, because, for Doris, character-based moral psychology is 
committed to a robust notion o f character—one that requires that a relevant character 
trait (e.g. helpful, compassionate, or heroic behaviour), be displayed in the 
appropriate eliciting condition— and these types of experiments seem to more 
accurately reflect the motivational impact of either the presence or absence of a 
situational variable, then characterological moral psychology fails as a compelling 
way to explain the observed differences in behaviour.
For Isen and Levin (1972), what is happening here is that the experience of 
finding some change in the coin return slot of the telephone creates an elevated mood
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effect—people feel good when they encounter what appears to be good luck— and 
this elevated mood effectively influences helping behaviour. For Doris, it is not the 
idea that one’s mood may effect their behaviour that is compelling—he treats this 
notion as trivially true and obvious—but rather, that one’s mood can be altered to 
produce such overt behaviour by something as trifling as finding a dime.
Nevertheless, he cautions against judging the non-helpers in this scenario too harshly; 
after all, helping to pick-up some dropped papers does not seem to rank as highly as 
saving a drowning child, in terms o f its importance as a character relevant behaviour 
eliciting condition. Nonetheless, to rank helping to pick-up papers as being an 
eliciting condition o f low importance does not change the results o f the study—the 
data stands that the mere finding of a dime was enough to significantly influence what 
can reasonably be considered to be character relevant behaviour in a way that does 
not support characterological conceptions. However, in this experiment, the 
participants did not undergo any kind o f personality assessment, which may 
undermine one’s confidence that the results are not telling o f personality or character 
dispositions. But for Doris, the odds that mostly compassionate or helpful character 
types found the dime, while unhelpful and non-compassionate types did not find a 
dime are slim and untroubling.
1.3 Bad Samaritans
The next experiment to be reviewed is derived from the Christian parable of 
the Good Samaritan. The parable recounts the story of a man who was robbed,
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stripped, and beaten close to death while traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho. As he 
lay wounded, three individuals pass by him separately; the first was a priest, the next 
a Levite, and lastly, a Samaritan. Both the priest and the Levite, upon seeing the 
injured man, cross over to the other side o f the road and continue on their way 
without stopping to offer their assistance. However, when the Samaritan saw the man, 
he approached him, dressed his wounds, and brought him to an inn. There he 
instmcted the innkeeper to take care of the man and paid him accordingly. In this 
parable the Samaritan, it is preached, exemplifies the type o f moral character (or 
action) that is appropriate to Christian aspirations.
Although one can imagine that the priest and the Levite had other pressing 
responsibilities to attend to, while perhaps the Samaritan did not, the standard reading 
of this parable tends to emphasize the differences in character3 rather than the 
differences in perceived time stress between the three passers by. That is to say, only 
the Samaritan is considered to be a compassionate kind o f person, while the priest and 
Levite are portrayed as having less flattering character types. In an attempt to discern 
just what factors (be it time pressure, religiosity, or a certain moral disposition) may 
be relevant to helping behaviour in such a scenario, Darley and Batson (1973) 
conducted a study involving students from the Princeton Theological Seminary who 
were recruited to take part in what they were told would be a study o f “religious 
education and vocations.” To begin, the students were to fill out questionnaires in one 
room before having to exit the building and pass through a courtyard on their way to a
3 O f course there are other ways to interpret the parable o f  the good Samaritan; for example, rather than 
placing the emphasis on differences in character, differences in perceived duty or moral judgment may 
be emphasized.
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second location where they were told they would be required to give a short verbal 
presentation. The experiment consisted of three groups of students, each o f which was 
assigned a different degree of temporal urgency. The first group was told upon 
leaving the initial site that they were running late, the second group that they were 
right on schedule, and the third that they would be a little early. These differing 
urgency indicators given to the groups prior to their leaving the initial site 
corresponded to how they would be classified in one of three experimental 
conditions: “high hurry”, “medium hurry”, and “low hurry” respectively.
While on their walk from the first site to the second, individual participants 
from each group would separately encounter a confederate playing the part o f a 
distressed individual hunched over and apparently in need o f some kind o f assistance. 
Common intuitions would suggest that since these students were preparing for a life 
of service in the ministry, they would be highly likely to offer some kind o f help or at 
least to ask whether or not the individual needed any assistance. In other words, we 
would expect that these individuals have the relevant type o f character dispositions to 
want to be helpful based upon the professional trajectory (marked by an ethic of 
helping), that they had chosen. However, the results paint a different picture. Indeed, 
helping behaviour appeared to vary considerably with the degree o f urgency o f the 
experimental condition, with sixty-three percent of the students helping in the “low 
hurry” condition, forty-five percent helping in the “medium hurry” condition, and 
down to only ten percent helping in the final “high hurry” category. That these results 
conflict with what would be commonly expected from a group of seminary students 
(i.e. that there would be no difference in helping behaviour across conditions since
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they should all share a similar disposition towards helping), leads Harman to 
conclude that, “standard interpretations o f the Good Samaritan Parable commit the 
fundamental attribution error o f overlooking the situational factors, in this case 
overlooking how much o f a hurry the various agents might be in” (2000a, p. 173).
According to Doris, when faced with such results, “it is difficult to resist 
situationist conclusions” (2002, p. 34). Indeed, even if  the hurried seminary students 
may have thought that their commitments to the experimenter were temporarily o f a 
higher order o f importance than their general obligation to inquire as to the wellbeing 
of the confederate, for Doris, it is not likely that such a consideration would be given 
much weight (p. 34). Again, he says, “there is the appearance o f disproportion; in this 
case the demands o f punctuality seem rather slight compared with the ethical demand 
to at least check on the condition o f the confederate” (2002, p. 34). Thus again, it 
appears that character relevant behaviour was influenced by a situational factor o f 
seemingly less importance than the moral imperative encountered. Indeed, in this 
case, as opposed to the ‘finding a dime’ example, the moral imperative appears to be 
o f a much higher order; that is, it can hardly be argued that helping someone to pick 
up scattered papers is as morally compelling as the need to inquire into the wellbeing 
of someone who appears to be in significant physical distress. However, both 
instances would seem to be appropriate for eliciting the relevant behaviour associated 
with what one would expect from those with compassionate dispositions: namely, 
helping.
These last two examples made reference to what may be considered non- 
coercive situational forces; that is, situational factors that would not typically be
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construed as having impending or forceful influence against one’s ability to act in 
concert with their perceived (or ascribed) character dispositions. The next experiment 
to be reviewed, however, might be taken to be at least somewhat different in this 
regard. It makes use o f what may be granted to be a fairly strong situational constraint 
upon behaviour, regardless o f what are believed to be one’s character based 
dispositions. That is to say, many people would likely agree that certain 
environmental and situational factors can have a great degree o f control over what 
behaviours one is likely to display, independently o f the type o f character one may 
have. One such situation can be imagined wherein a subordinate is given orders by 
another who would be classified as an authority figure. This situation is not unlike the 
experiment that follows. However, what ought to be kept in mind throughout the next 
section is that the participants were told at the outset that they may quit the 
experiment at any time (which should somewhat offset the apparent forcefulness of 
the situation); and further, that people who were informed o f the experimental 
procedure were no more reluctant to make character based predictions o f behaviour— 
which would seem to signal a general belief that such conditions are not enough to 
override character based moral dispositions.
1.4 Authority vs. Autonomy -  A Shocking Situation
Imagine if  you will, the following scenario: you decide to respond to a 
newspaper add posted by a university that is seeking participants for a paid study 
involving memory and learning. Upon arrival you are greeted by an experimenter
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wearing a lab coat who introduces you to another participant who will be taking part 
in the experiment with you. A draw is performed and you are chosen for the position 
of ‘teacher’ while the other participant is selected for the ‘learner’ role. The ‘learner’ 
is a friendly middle aged accountant who is strapped down to a chair to restrict his 
movement. An electrode is attached to his wrist which will be used to administer 
shocks; you are assured that these will cause no “permanent tissue damage”, and you 
are given a stinging example o f what such a shock feels like. In a separate room, you 
are seated before what is labeled a “shock generator” and instructed that you will be 
required to administer shocks of an increasing magnitude (in fifteen volt increments) 
to the other participant for each wrong answer (or non-answer) that he provides on a 
word association test. The shocks register between ‘slight shock’ starting at fifteen 
volts, and continue all the way to ‘Danger: Severe shock’ and ‘XXX’ with a final 
rating of four-hundred and fifty volts of electricity. Should you pause or express any 
trepidation about what is taking place you are repeatedly enjoined by the 
experimenter in a firm but polite manner to “Please continue,” or that “The 
experiment requires that you continue,” or that “It is absolutely essential that you 
continue,” and finally that “You have no other choice, you must go on.” How far do 
you envision would you be likely to go?
This scenario is exactly what happened in the famous series o f experiments 
performed by Stanley Milgram at Yale University in the early nineteen-sixties. Of 
course the ‘learner’ in this experiment was actually a confederate who never really 
experienced any actual electric shocks. However, in some versions o f the experiment, 
at a certain magnitude (seventy-five volts), a recording was played for each
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increasing shock intensity that voiced the learner’s growing distress mixed with 
complaints about a heart condition (which were clearly audible to the participant), 
before these would fall silent at the three-hundred and forty-five volt level. O f the 
people that Milgram surveyed (1974, p. 27-31) about the experiment, none of them 
said that they would continue shocking to the very end of the experiment if  they had 
been participants. And when asked how many people they believed would continue to 
shock right through to the end of the experiment, the general prediction was two 
percent or less. However, and this is likely why Milgram’s experiments stirred up 
such a controversy, throughout numerous replications and similar experiments, the 
general findings can be expressed as obtaining roughly two thirds complete 
obedience. That is to say that, on average, between sixty to seventy percent of 
participants “shocked” the learner all the way to the final four-hundred and fifty volt 
level. Such results are staggering and stand in marked contrast to what people would 
commonly assume to be the social behavioural norm. Indeed, Harman thinks that for 
most people who encounter these results, “it is hard not to think there is something 
terribly wrong with the subject [i.e. participant]” and that “it is extremely tempting to 
attribute the subject’s performance to a character defect in the subject rather than to 
details o f the situation” (2000a, p. 171). However, for Harman, such tendencies 
simply amount to being illustrations of the fundamental attribution error mentioned 
earlier—that is, the erroneous tendency to find fault with the individual rather than 
recognize the force the situation has upon behaviour. So how, according to 
situationists, is one to interpret such intuitively challenging results?
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According to Doris, it is unlikely that these experiments tapped into a sinister 
segment o f the normal population in America, or that people are generally cruel 
(2002, p. 42). Rather, he cautions that, “trait-contrary behaviour does not necessarily 
signal the possession of a contrary trait; even active failures o f compassion do not 
necessarily imply sadism” (2002, p. 42). Instead, what these experiments suggest for 
Doris is that, once again, the situation has displayed a serious power to affect human 
behaviour. In this case, the mere presence and directions of an experimenter were 
enough to influence participants to commit very destructive behaviours.
Certainly, there are various reasons advanced by critics o f these experiments 
to doubt that they reflect a ‘real-world’ phenomenon of destructive obedience. For 
example, at first glance, it appears absurd that anyone would be so powerfully 
influenced by such simple and non-threatening directives as those voiced by the 
experimenter; and thus, some have suggested that most of the participants must have 
known that the shocks were not real. However, for Doris, such situations are not 
without their analogs in other social and organizational contexts; for example, in the 
military, in fraternities, and in street gangs, various rituals (presumably hazings and 
the like), take place that maintain a similar dynamic, and these are taken very 
seriously by the people involved (2002, p. 43). Furthermore, Doris paraphrases 
Milgram’s observation that, “the best evidence for the experimental realism of [tjhis 
paradigm is the extraordinary anxiety o f the subjects, amply documented by 
experimental transcripts” (2002, p. 43). Indeed, according to Milgram, subjects were 
noted to “sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan, and dig their fingernails into 
their flesh” (as cited in Doris, p.42-3). For Doris, this means that many subjects were
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deeply conflicted about what they were doing. That is to say, many o f them displayed 
an obvious discomfort with their required actions, but nevertheless, the majority 
continued to follow instructions though to the highest level o f shock— a result that 
remains deeply telling about the overriding power of the situation.
Doris similarly rejects claims to the effect that the participants were assured of 
the safety o f the experiment by an implicit confidence derived from the esteem they 
had for the institutional setting (2002, p. 44). That is to say, he does not believe that 
any internalized sense o f trust in the prestige of the experimental locale, nor in the 
competence of the experimenter, were sufficient to alert the majority o f the 
participants that the shocks were not real, especially since about a year after the study, 
eighty percent o f six hundred former participants responded to a questionnaire that 
they were either certain or thought it likely that the shocks were real (p. 43). 
Furthermore, the institutional setting was shown not to have any notable influence, 
since at one point the experiment was moved off o f the university campus to an 
apparently less prestigious locale and still maintained similar results. Moreover, in 
regards to the apparent competence o f the experimenter (also advanced as a possible 
implicit clue to the experiment’s deception), a modified version o f the experiment 
was developed by another group who intentionally made the experimenter appear 
surprised with what was taking place—the results were ninety-one percent obedience 
(p. 44). Therefore, for Doris, the suggestion that the participants knew about the 
deception all along and were merely play-acting simply does not hold up to scrutiny. 
Rather, he claims, “there are numerous reasons to think that widespread obedience 
may obtain with credulous subjects” (2002, p. 45).
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This obedience, according to Doris, rather than by appealing to differences in 
character, is best understood in terms o f situational factors. And this is because, the 
degree to which participants were found to be obedient was highly similar across 
similarly structured experimental situations; however, where the experimental 
situation was changed, there was a corresponding change in the degree o f obedience 
obtained. For example, when participants were allowed to decide for themselves just 
how intense a shock they were willing to administer, only three percent opted to 
shock to the highest level. And when the experimenter was removed from the room 
only to give instructions by phone, there was also a significant drop in obedience. 
These and other examples prompted Doris to claim that, “the variation in obedience 
across experimental conditions— from near negligible to near total— is powerful 
evidence that situational variation can swamp individual differences” (2002, p. 46). In 
other words, explanations o f these kinds o f experimental results that appeal to 
personality or character differences pale in comparison to situationist accounts, since 
the latter provide a much more informative and accurate account o f  the reasons for 
the noted variation in behaviour. However, Doris does admit that since the 
experiments did not obtain total behavioural conformity from all participants, 
“individual dispositional differences must be doing some of the work” (2002, p. 46). 
However, he considers attempts to relate personality measures to obedience scores to 
be generally unimpressive.
According to Doris, what may be more important to securing obedience than 
the presence o f a perceived authority figure is the notion that it is the authority figure 
that bears responsibility for one’s actions in these kinds of instances. Indeed, in
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Milgram’s study, the experimenter was noted to provide assurances to that effect on 
occasion (Doris, 2002, p. 50). Furthermore, as cited by Doris, Milgram’s later survey 
revealed that the obedient participants considered themselves less responsible than 
did the disobedient participants. However, such considerations cannot be taken as 
providing a complete account the behavioural obedience in question, since those who 
did obey still felt themselves at least partially responsible— as was evidenced by the 
physical signs o f stress that were displayed.
Maybe it was the gradual nature o f the experiment that was responsible for 
securing obedience since the decision to stop at any particular point is hindered by the 
previous decision to proceed at a shock level only one degree lower in severity.
Others have noted that this creates a “justification problem” (Doris, 2002, p. 50); that 
is, if  the participant eventually decides to stop, she is then faced with the issue o f 
trying to justify what made the previous shock acceptable but not the one at which 
she stopped. This idea has some support in the sense that, the point at which most 
people became disobedient was when the learner first voiced their desire to withdraw 
from the experiment— this provides the justification to stop for the participant. 
However, Doris speculates that the varying degrees o f shock intensity listed upon the 
shock device panel should have provided similar opportunities to justify stopping 
since it seems plausible that some could have used these labels to justify disobedience 
(for example, that they may be fine with administering a ‘strong shock’ but not a 
‘very strong shock’) (p. 50). Therefore, for Doris, such an analysis must be treated 
carefully since, like the notion of the partial relief o f responsibility mentioned
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previously, it appears only capable of providing a partial account o f the observed 
behaviour.
1.5 Situationist Motivations
For the situationist, what the types o f experiments mentioned in this chapter 
reveal is the failure o f characterological conceptions to adequately account for the 
observed differences in behaviour—especially where behaviours are shown to differ 
markedly in connection with differing situational variables (even where these 
situational variables’ power to influence is not recognized by the participants 
themselves). Moreover, all three of the experiments reviewed can be seen to 
undermine the notion o f the stability of character as it is expressed in the disposition 
of compassion. In other words, all three experimental settings appeared to have 
provided plausible and relevant eliciting conditions wherein one would expect people 
with compassionate characters to behave in very specific ways; namely, to be helpful, 
or not to cause harm. However, as was demonstrated, the tendency to help or to 
ignore and to harm or to not harm was powerfully influenced by differing aspects of 
the situation. Therefore, to appeal to differences in the character types o f the 
participants (i.e. their compassionate dispositions) in order to explain their behaviour, 
would be to ignore the much more accurate and informative explanation that is 
provided by taking the power of the situational factors seriously.
In other words, one may attempt to explain the results o f these experiments in 
a way that preserves character based conclusions; for example, one might suggest that
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in the obedience experiments those who did not shock the learner to the full amount 
have more compassionate characters than those who did shock to the very limit. 
However, such a strategy, though it may preserve the notion o f character, does not 
explain why the behaviour of the participants varied so drastically with changes in the 
experimental situation; for example, in the variants of the obedience studies wherein 
the experimenter gave instructions by phone or allowed the participants to choose the 
level o f shock they would administer for themselves— characterological accounts 
cannot make sense of the resulting significant drop in harmful behaviour as compared 
with the experimental results o f the original design. In these instances, the only 
answer that a characterological account can provide is to the effect that the different 
versions of the experiment just so happened to arrive at the specific distributions of 
compassionate and uncompassionate character types that they did by chance alone. 
However, the greater the number o f experiments that share compatible findings 
among differing experimental contexts and their results, the less plausible such a view 
becomes. Furthermore, according to both D&H, there exists already a wealth of 
experimental evidence that confirms the situationist position and leaves 
characterological explanations seriously wanting.
Indeed, for D&H, it is not just the experimental designs reviewed in this paper 
that motivate situationism; rather, they argue that these experiments are 
“representative o f established trends” in the experimental literature and that 
“situationism is motivated by a pattern of results, not the results o f any particular 
study” (Doris, 2002, p. 35). Furthermore, according to Harman, “No one supposes 
that these [three] experiments, taken by themselves, show that there are no character
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traits”; what they do show, however, is that when observers attribute the noted 
variations in behaviour to character dispositions, “the observers are wrong: that 
cannot be the explanation” (2003, p. 90-91). They are wrong because these sorts of 
attributions do not adequately explain the said behavioural variation, that is, across 
the varying experimental conditions.
The results o f this large body of experimental data lead Doris to conclude that, 
“the empirical evidence indicates that compassion relevant behavior is far more 
situationally variable than the globalist theses [i.e. character based notions] of 
consistency and evaluative integration would have us believe” (2002, p. 61). So 
although we may think that an individual’s tendency to behave compassionately (or in 
a way that might suggest some other disposition), is a result o f their particular 
character, such behaviours, on the situationist score, are more accurately the results of 
various situational factors. The preceding leads Doris to conclude that, “Globalism is 
an empirically inadequate account o f human functioning” (2002, p. 61). And again 
more boldly for Harman that, “Since it is possible to explain our ordinary belief in 
character traits as deriving from certain illusions, we must conclude that there is no 
empirical basis for the existence o f character traits” (2000a, p. 166). Thus we have the 
main thrust o f the situationist argument— empirical results from a multitude of 
experiments do not support the traditional understanding of character, which leads 
situationists to suggest that it should be abandoned.
But it is not simply the experimental results that sustain situationism (although 
these are certainly keystone to the position); there are also indicators in more true to 
life contexts that betray the overwhelming power o f the situation. For example, Doris
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mentions the extraordinary internal conflict that must have been experienced by the 
doctors who worked in the Nazi concentration camps during World War Two (2002, 
p. 53-8). Many o f these doctors, he claims, had the onerous task o f deciding which of 
the arrivals would be forced to work in the camps but live, and which would be killed 
immediately (p. 54). These doctors originally made the choice to dedicate themselves 
to a profession that aims to save lives, and yet their death camp duties were in direct 
opposition to such aims. That people are capable o f such acts can be mind boggling; 
however, there is reason to believe that various situational factors were responsible 
for facilitating such aberrant behaviour. Indeed, according Lifton (1986), as 
paraphrased by Doris,
The Auschwitz doctors underwent an intensive socialization process in order to effect 
their “adaptation” to life in the death-world o f  the camp. Doctors frequently drank 
heavily together and often expressed dissatisfaction with camp practices, but these 
protests eventuated in group rationalizations; the alcoholic therapy sessions were a 
means for the doctors to establish consensual validation for behaviours that were 
strongly dissonant with precamp values. (2002, p. 56)
None of this, for Doris, is to deny the facts: the doctors committed some 
monstrous acts, but it is not clear that they would have all behaved in such despicable 
ways had there been no situational facilitation of their conduct, for example, in the 
form of “alcoholic therapy sessions” and the like. Furthermore, previous to and 
outside of the camp life, there is little reason to think that these people were utterly 
evil. After all, they were doctors, some of whom had families to which they were
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devoted and, according to Doris, “A plausible conjecture, just as with the Milgram 
obedients.. is that a very substantial percentage o f perpetrators in the holocaust had 
previously led lives characterized by ordinary levels o f compassion” (2002, p. 54). So 
once again, we are left with the image o f the overwhelming power o f the situational 
context to override individual dispositions and their presumed efficacy.
Harman warns that there are further negative consequences to thinking in 
terms o f character based dispositions (though he does little by way o f justifying his 
views on these points). For example, he believes that misattributions o f character 
result in failures o f political reasoning, and misjudgments o f the actions o f others. 
Moreover, he believes that, “in extreme cases, [these misjudgments] lead to ethnic 
warfare” (2003, p. 421), since they take the place o f a rational understanding of the 
common struggle by various groups for limited resources (2000a, p. 177). He also 
thinks that programs for moral education are misguided where they rely upon the 
notion of character development, since, according to him, there is no evidence that 
character exists.
There are however, alternatives to the situationist interpretation o f both the 
empirical research done in psychology and the underlying factors that motivate 
significant world events. In the next chapter, I will review the arguments of several 
philosophers who are in various ways critical o f the situationist interpretations, most 
of whom argue against situationist conclusions and their prescription that the 
commonplace notion o f character be abandoned. And later, in section 3 .4 ,1 will 
contribute an argument to the debate that I believe should persuade the situationists to
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reevaluate their position, or at least, to recognize the limited scope o f application as 
well as the limited realm o f warranted inferences provided by the psychological data.
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2.0 Situationism Scrutinized
Many o f the philosophers who have taken issue with the situationist position 
have done so in an attempt to save traditional views o f virtue ethics from falling out 
of favor and into obscurity. At the very least, it is certain that many o f these 
philosophers acknowledge that, when understood in a particular way, the empirical 
studies referenced by the situationists may seem to be a serious problem for virtue 
ethics. Nevertheless, few agree that the results o f these studies warrant that virtue 
ethics or notions o f character be abandoned completely, and some even contend that 
they are no real threat to virtue ethics or character at all. Indeed, as was mentioned 
earlier, there are alternative interpretive accounts available o f  the implications o f the 
empirical data. Furthermore, although some of these alternative readings may differ 
in their approach to formulating a response to situationism, most agree that, as it 
stands, the data upon which the situationists rely do not alone provide sufficient 
warrant for the abandonment o f virtue ethics and character. Indeed, it seems that most 
who are critical o f the situationist position would agree with John Sabini and Maury 
Silver that, in this case, the situationist “philosophers and psychologists have drawn 
wrong conclusions from psychological results.. . [and that,].. .the lesson to be learned 
is substantially narrower than the movement seems to believe” (2005, p. 535).
Since many o f the refutations of situationism have been motivated by attempts 
to defend virtue ethics, much of the talk about character is situated in the larger 
context of how character relates to virtue; and as such, though this chapter will 
primarily focus upon the defense o f character, several of the arguments presented will
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make reference to the implications of character for virtue ethics. But this should come 
as no surprise, nor should it confound the aim of this thesis, since the popular 
understanding of character has been derived from Aristotelian notions; and for 
Aristotle, the virtues are “states of character” (Kaplan [Ed.], 1958, p .188).
According to Christian Miller (2003, p.367)— a critic o f the situationist 
interpretations of D&H— the situationist account o f character falls short o f providing 
a sufficiently detailed understanding of just what a character trait is. For Harman, 
character traits are broad-based, relatively stable and long-term dispositions or habits 
to act in specific ways, and these dispositions may be evoked to explain certain 
aspects of a person’s behaviour. However, as Miller notes, such a classification fails 
to exclude persistent behaviours such as smoking, alcoholism, bulimic purging, and 
many other stable dispositions that most would not count as character traits. The 
potential for ambiguity in regards to ‘trait-terms’ and their perceived relevance to the 
notion o f character has also been recognized by Richard Brandt, who claims, “It may 
be objected that the suggested dichotomy o f personality-trait-terms into those 
designating traits of moral character and others is questionable, and [that] there is no 
reasonably definite intuitively acceptable class of names of traits o f moral character” 
(1970, p. 24). Nevertheless, Harman’s characterization is similar to the one provided 
by Doris. More importantly, both philosophers take the general expectation for the 
behavioural consistency of agents within the appropriate eliciting conditions to be one 
o f the more central and distinguishing features o f character. Indeed, according to 
Gopal Sreenivasan, “the mainstay of situationism’s critique consists in the claim that 
people’s behaviour is not cross-situationally consistent” (2002, p.51). Thus, it is in
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regards to the preceding claim— and more importantly, what the research has to say 
about it—that the views of both D&H will be challenged in this chapter.
The challenge to character-eliminativist situationism will be advanced on 
several fronts: from alternative interpretations regarding the implications o f the 
experimental data and arguments about character development and training, to the 
incompleteness of the situationist understanding o f character. Furthermore, the 
importance of the perspective o f the individual, both in terms o f subjective self­
appraisals and the practical reasoning aimed at the achievement o f the good life, will 
be brought to light in order to expose some of the inadequacies o f situationist theory 
and interpretations o f research. Indeed, by the end o f this chapter, the limitations of 
the situationist project for the elimination o f character should be clear and obvious.
2.1 Non-Situationist Interpretations
In regards to Harman’s interpretation o f the results o f the Milgram obedience 
experiments, Miller argues that, “it is not at all clear what implications they are 
supposed to have with respect to the issue o f the existence o f global [i.e. robust] 
character traits” (2003, p. 369). First, Harman does not mention what specific yet 
absent character trait should be relevant to the situation. Nor does he attempt to 
explain the behaviour o f those participants who did disobey the directives. It would 
seem, according to Miller, that since all of the participants were in the same 
situational context, the disobedience o f some o f them must have been due to some 
internal disposition, for example, that they have more compassionate character types.
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(See Doris’ claim to the same effect in the previous chapter, section 1.4; and note his 
dismissive treatment o f this point.) Thus, according to Miller, “the results that 
Harman takes to be a reductio o f character-based explanations, may actually turn out 
to be precisely what one should expect on a sufficiently nuanced understanding of 
virtue ethics” (2003, p. 370). In other words, such an account o f virtue ethics takes 
note of just how uncommon truly virtuous agents are thought to be. What this means 
for the idea o f character, is that the findings of social psychological studies, like those 
of Milgram, may actually be interpreted as supportive of characterological 
conceptions, so long as the understanding o f character one is working with is 
comparable to how it is conceived within a sufficiently sophisticated account o f the 
virtues. Moreover, even if  one is not attempting to explain the behaviour o f the 
Milgram study participants in the context o f a theory o f virtue, one may simply 
conclude, according to Sabini and Silver, that, “people value obeying authority more 
than we thought they did” (2005, p. 547); and this remains a reasonable interpretive 
strategy o f the results which poses no threat to the idea o f character. Furthermore, that 
some individuals might ‘value obeying authority’ could in fact turn out to be due to 
their being in possession of a more general underlying character disposition: that they 
have obedient character types. And thus, far from dispelling the notion o f character, 
in this case, situationist research seems to have brought to light a hitherto neglected 
aspect o f it.
With respect to the previously illustrated Darley and Batson study, which 
focused in part on the effects o f time-stress upon helping behaviour, Miller argues, “it 
seems reasonable to think that we should focus on the students’ internal dispositions
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in order to predict the outcome o f this experiment only if  we had strong antecedent 
reasons for believing that the majority o f the test subjects possessed the relevant 
global character trait(s) to begin with” (2003, p. 371). However, for Miller, these 
reasons are not forthcoming, and the vocational trajectory o f the students is not 
enough to warrant the assumption that they have all obtained the requisite character 
trait o f compassion. Indeed, contrarily to what might be expected o f those in religious 
professions— namely, that they be kind and compassionate— history stands as a 
record that is filled with anecdotes o f cruel and cold-hearted nuns as well as 
criminally perverted pederast priests. Moreover, for other lines o f work, we have no 
reason to suspect that particular character traits are related in any strong way to job 
choice; for instance, it would be unreasonable to think that all polygraph operators 
never lie (or take themselves to be perfectly honest), or that no police officers have 
ever stolen money from any o f the criminals they placed in custody. So a person’s 
choice of profession does not alone guarantee that they would possess a given 
character trait. Thus, according to Miller, “it seems only natural that we would also 
want to take situational considerations into account” (2003, p. 371).
But even where we do have reason to believe that people possess the character 
trait in question, we have no reason to assume that such character traits might not on 
occasion be overridden by other concerns (or character traits), such as the urgency of 
the obligation to report to the second phase of a study for which one has made a 
commitment to attend. Indeed, as noted by Rachana Kamtekar, “the seminarians in 
the Darley and Batson experiment were faced with competing demands for help, from 
the experimenters and from the person in the doorway [i.e. the confederate]: it was in
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the course o f helping the experimenters that they were called upon to help the person 
in the doorway. Whomever they helped, they would also have been failing to help 
someone and so displaying inconsistently helpful behaviour” (2004, p. 473). Thus, a 
single character trait may be burdened by multiple demands; where this is the case we 
cannot reasonably assume that a failure to act on one of the demands counts as 
discontinuing evidence against the character trait in question.
It is in response to the same study by Darley and Batson that Sabini and Silver 
raise an important concern about how people rate the moral demands o f the situations 
in which they find themselves. They ask, “shouldn’t the subjects see that one [moral 
obligation] is more important than the other” (2005, p. 558 footnote); namely, the 
obligation to help the person in distress over the obligation to report to the study?
And perhaps they should. However, the general reluctance o f participants in the ‘high 
hurry’ condition to stop and help the confederate is not necessarily a failure to act 
morally (since they are still ‘helpful’ to the experimenter), but rather, it is a failure to 
identify the most morally demanding feature o f one’s environment; and as such, 
although they may experience difficulties in discerning which obligation to act upon, 
this does not necessarily mean that they are acting out o f character or without regard 
for moral demands. Thus, although the ability to distinguish which moral action is 
most required remains an important concern, it is not a concern which directly 
challenges the idea that people have character types.
There are additional concerns, however, that are raised by experimental 
constructs like the one o f Darley and Batson; namely, that the introduction o f a time- 
stress variable may produce more than one character subverting effect, and some of
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these effects may be taken to be quite reasonable conditions for, or even inevitably 
lead to, the absence o f character relevant displays o f behaviour. For example, time 
stress can have a varying degree of impact upon an individual’s scope o f attention and 
reflective capacity; for example, within the Darley and Batson study, failure to assist 
the confederate might have more to do with the fact that he was not well noticed, or 
his distress not accurately identified, than it does with a failure to act from a 
designated character disposition.
Attention may also be influenced by affective and mood states. For instance, 
according to Brandt, “character-traits are very like intellectual capacity; a person with 
a high I.Q. may, in a state o f emotion, do very poorly on a standard test. And 
emotional disturbance may affect the influence any need/aversion may have on 
action” (1970, p. 35). So an individual who is dealing with turbulent emotions may 
occasionally fail to notice various aspects o f morally demanding situations, or even 
that a situation is o f moral concern. In cases where the moral failing is a minor one, 
we would normally excuse it on the grounds that the individual was emotionally 
disturbed, rather than judge an individual to be inconsistent in, for example, their 
regard for others. Mood states, like affective states, can similarly have a significant 
impact on attention, although as Sabini and Silver note, “being in a bad mood does 
not excuse the failure to notice screams of agony and the like, but it is the sort of 
thing that excuses the failure to notice some dropped pencils (or papers as in the Isen 
and Levin study).. .[thus].. .the fact that people are inconsistent in whether they pick 
up (or not) depending on their mood is not sufficient inconsistency to warrant 
abandoning virtue ethics” (2005, p. 540). Here the point is made powerfully clear: it
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would take much more than the failure to act with courtesy to disconfirm the kind of 
character described by traditional virtue ethics, since this failure could be excused for 
the attentional reasons mentioned above. But we might not take these same reasons to 
excuse more powerfully demanding situational cues, for example, as in cases where 
people appear to be in significant physical danger or distress (e.g. the Milgram 
studies). Helping someone to pick-up some dropped papers hardly seems like a 
paradigm case o f  compassionate behaviour. Thus, where the intention is to challenge 
the existence o f a particular trait o f character, employing paradigm examples would 
appear necessary to secure more powerful and compelling results.
These arguments notwithstanding, Miller agrees with Harman that there is in 
fact persuasive experimental support for the view that people typically over­
emphasize the internal dispositions o f others at the cost of failing to acquire realistic 
appraisals of the behavioural influence o f situational factors, otherwise known as the 
tendency to make the fundamental attribution error. However, this fact simply does 
not pose a threat to virtue ethics or the notion o f character since, “nothing follows 
about the existence o f character traits in general from the tendency o f psychology test 
subjects.. .to fall prey to this error” (2003, p. 371). Or as Sreenivasan claims, “the 
fundamental attribution error is irrelevant to the question of whether anyone really 
has a character trait” (2002, p. 53-53). Indeed, Miller encourages philosophers to 
become familiar with the experimental literature since they may discover ways to 
counteract this tendency towards error. It is, after all, as Sreenivasan notes, a simple 
failure to, “appreciate.. .that the reliability o f their predictions depends upon the
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number [and distribution] o f observations underlying their trait attribution” (2002, p. 
52[53]). And such failures, it seems, ought to admit of correction.
But Harman does not merely cite the experimental evidence regarding the 
fundamental attribution error to lend support to his view, while maintaining that the 
social psychological research on things like helping behaviour and obedience 
confirms his position, he also suggests that there is no empirical support for the view 
that global character traits even exist. However, as noted by Miller (2003), even if 
one were to grant that Harman’s interpretations are correct, and that he could develop 
his argument that the findings do not support the idea of global character traits, his 
analysis remains restricted to an examination o f the results from only the field o f 
social psychology. What would be required to show that there is no empirical support 
for the idea o f global character traits is that there is either no other source o f empirical 
evidence that may be supportive o f the idea, or that if  any number o f other sources of 
empirical evidence may be available, these must all fail to provide support for the 
notion of global traits (p. 372-3). However, Harman provides no such argument. 
Moreover, even within the psychological literature, Harman failed to notice at least 
one very promising method in character research that has been empirically validated; 
namely, the template-matching technique developed by Daryl Bern and David Funder 
(1983, p. 203). Indeed, according to Bern, “the standard template-matching procedure 
has proven to be versatile and empirically successfid [italics added] both as a tool of 
verification and o f exploration” (1983, p. 208). In other words, the template matching 
procedure is successful with respect to its ability to predict character relevant 
behaviours across situations and for personality theory testing respectively. So, in
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short, it would appear that Harman’s statement regarding the lacking o f empirical 
support for character is simply false.
2.2 Consistency and Character Development
Perhaps one of the most powerful objections (and maybe even most obvious) 
to the situationist position is that, even if one is committed to the view that there are 
such things as global character traits, it does not follow that one accepts that these 
traits must be behaviourally evidenced in every single instance in which one might 
possibly expect them to arise. In other words, the experimental evidence gathered by 
situationists is really only threatening, if  it is threatening at all, to those who hold a 
very strong view regarding the required consistency o f an agent’s behaviour in order 
for the agent to be thought to possess a certain type of character. Miller (2003) 
captures this point well:
[The current social psychological findings] will count against the virtue ethicist [or 
characterological conceptions] only i f  her view is committed to an extremely strong 
account o f  character traits according to which an agent has a particular global trait T 
only if  he attempts to perform the relevant T-sortal act in every T-eliciting 
circumstance. But I can see no reason why any virtue ethical theory [or conception o f  
character] should be saddled with such an implausible account. For it has rarely been 
part o f  the view that possession o f a virtue [or character trait] is an all or nothing 
phenomenon; rather, it comes in degrees. In addition, acquiring a particular virtue [or
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character type] is typically thought to be a very gradual process full o f  numerous 
setbacks, (p. 378)
Allow me to draw an informative analogy: learning to be virtuous or to have a 
robust kind of character is, in a sense, like learning to swim. Situational factors may 
affect both. For example, just as certain conditions (e.g. high waves, very cold water, 
and complete darkness) can have a serious impact upon an individual’s ability to 
swim well, especially if  they are still learning how to swim, so too can various 
situational conditions (e.g. time stress, the presence o f an authority figure, et cetera) 
impair character relevant behaviours while the character type is still developing. But 
just as the frantic splashing that results from placing someone who is just learning to 
swim into a freezing cold pool o f high waves in utter darkness does not mean that the 
person cannot swim (or leam to swim under more favorable early conditions), neither 
can the influence o f the various situational factors mentioned be taken to prove that 
an individual has no character (or that the individual would be incapable o f 
developing one in more conducive early settings).
Indeed, most would agree that the formation o f a character type or trait 
involves a learned and sustained process o f development, and that throughout this 
process an agent may occasionally fail to express the appropriate character trait for a 
number o f different reasons. But this shift in understanding from a situationist 
perspective to a more realistic and more widely accepted view o f character—one in 
which it is seen as a developmental process that allows for some error or 
inconsistency—highlights another serious problem for situationist interpretations: 
namely, that the experimental research upon which they commonly rely does not
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programs cited by situationists are not longitudinal studies, and as such, they cannot 
begin to address the question o f whether or not ‘global’ character traits exist since the 
experiments cited do not attempt to track repetitions or patterns o f specific 
behaviours, but rather, only deal with isolated instances of behaviour. This point is 
crucial, and it creates a serious counter problem for the situationist view that the there 
is no empirical reason to assume that global character traits exist and that, therefore, 
the traditional conception of character ought to be abandoned. In the first place, this 
counter problem shows that the empirical research cited by situationists is not up to 
the task o f showing whether or not global character traits exist-—to do this would 
require that longitudinal studies be done. Thus, it is no wonder that Harman finds no 
empirical support for global character traits since he is not even looking in the right 
place for it. Secondly, it shows that the experimental research employed by the 
situationists is insufficient to warrant the abandonment o f characterological 
conceptions since the studies cited do not directly challenge the general notion of 
character.
As noted by Miller, even the most generous appraisal of the situationist 
argument from empirical research should only result in the view that most o f the 
individuals studied in the cited experiments did not possess fully cultivated character 
traits; and according to him, “virtue ethicists can readily agree that some experiments 
in social psychology confirm that there currently is not widespread full possession of 
global character traits” (2003, p. 379). They can concede this point without worry 
since most virtue ethical theories take the virtues (and the character types associated
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with them), to be rarely achieved, and difficult to fully acquire. Thus, they are not 
committed to the expectation that their manifestations be unfalteringly observable in 
the actions o f the average person. Or as Sreenivasan puts it, “if  a theory o f virtue only 
applies in the first instance to ‘some people’, then its empirical presuppositions are 
not falsified [by the data put forward by situationists] unless it is really true that next 
to no one’s (virtue) traits are cross-situationally consistent” (2002, p. 57). So even if 
the people who display the appropriate kind of behavioural consistency are in the 
minority, traditional virtue theory and conceptions o f character can still withstand the 
situationist challenge.
What this means, for Miller, is that, “rather than disconfirming virtue ethics, 
social psychologists have to some extent provided supporting evidence for certain 
traditionally prominent features o f the view” (2003, p. 379). One prominent feature 
being just how unlikely it is to encounter an individual who has obtained full virtue, 
or a fully developed character type. Moreover, as Nafsika Athanassoulis (2000) 
argues, that a virtuous character type be fully developed by anyone may be 
exceedingly rare or even unnecessary for sustaining virtue ethical theory—since, in so 
far as an ethical theory is intended to guide moral action, it may still succeed in this 
by employing the individual o f virtuous character as an ideal from which to guide 
one’s actions in uncertain yet morally demanding situations, regardless o f whether or 
not such a fully virtuous individual actually exists (p. 217).
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2.3 Empirical Considerations
Even without reference to the virtues, many would likely allow that an 
individual may act ‘out o f character’ on a given occasion without such an admission 
necessarily leading to the suspicion that the person’s typical behaviours are widely 
inconsistent or telling against a more settled disposition. As noted by Miller, “in some 
cases of character trait attribution, individuals with those traits might fail to meet 
certain expectations in particularly demanding circumstances. Nonetheless, character 
traits could still be important causal factors in an explanation for why those people 
behave the way they do in most ordinary [italics added] situations” (2003, p. 380- 
381). So it would seem that the experimental results cited by situationists (e.g. the 
Milgram studies), need not be considered to be radically counterintuitive in regards to 
the generally held views on character. Rather, where intuitions regarding the expected 
behaviour o f participants in experimental contexts have been recorded, they seem 
more likely to signal instances o f the fundamental attribution error or unjustified 
character attributions than the inadequacy of characterological conceptions to make 
sense of human action. After all, characterological conceptions o f action are widely 
held to allow for some flexibility in the face of various pressures.
Although allowing the concept of character such flexibility may appear to 
render it irrefutable, this is in fact not the case. The question may still be settled on 
empirical grounds. However, this can only be reasonably accomplished by way of 
longitudinal research, since such a method allows individuals and their behaviours to 
be tracked over time, and thus may provide a ‘global’ image o f character or its
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absence. If  such a method reveals that there is little to no consistency in the average 
individual’s reactions to various deeply similar situations that would generally be 
predicted to elicit character relevant behaviour of a certain type, then the case against 
character is bolstered considerably. However, and this point is a serious concern for 
situationists, such behavioural inconsistency across very similar eliciting situations is 
also telling against situationism, since the situation, in this case, would be unable to 
achieve behavioural conformity as well. In other words, if  participants are reacting 
inconsistently to very similar situational cues, then the view that a ‘situational force’ 
is responsible for motivating behaviour is undermined. This is because, in order for a 
situational factor to be considered responsible for motivating certain behaviours, it 
must produce the same behavioural effect in a highly reliable manner. This is not to 
say that acquiring compelling empirical support for situationism is not possible, but 
rather, that it requires carefully developed research programs. For example, as was 
noted with the variants o f the Milgram study, intentionally slight situational variations 
across generally similar experimental conditions did have significant effects.
However, what would be required to render such results more convincing (and 
supportive o f the situationist position), would be for such experiments to employ the 
same group o f subjects across the various trials in order to track the behavioural 
effects o f the subtle situational manipulations against the presumed efficacy of their 
individual characters.
Should such refined forms of longitudinal research on character occur, I am 
inclined to expect reasonably high levels o f individual consistency ratings across 
multiple and similar character eliciting situations for at least some participants— since
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even the demanding pressures o f the Milgram studies did not obtain total obedience— 
and this is all that the standard views on character or virtue would require. However, 
even if  the experimental designs reached the stage o f refinement previously 
mentioned, one would still need to retain a critical attitude in regards to the ‘slight’ 
situational manipulations involved. The reason is that in some cases, one might 
encounter an experimental condition commonly taken to be capable o f overriding 
character that is masquerading as a subtle manipulation that character should be able 
to withstand. In other words, just what renders an experimental manipulation a 
‘slight’ one would need to be given serious attention; that is, how these potential 
slight manipulations are characterized and interpreted must be the object o f careful 
scrutiny. Otherwise some o f the experimental results may be taken to count against 
character where in fact they ought not to. With these measures in place, however, it 
seems reasonable to think that the suggested form of experimental design could be 
capable o f bringing the debate over character closer to a realistic resolution.
2.4 Character Training
Another important response to the situationist position remains: namely, that 
even if most people are found lacking in regards to a longitudinally testable global 
personality or character trait, this finding alone does not mean that people are 
incapable o f developing the traits in question through the appropriate training. Indeed 
the descriptive ‘is’ o f the results o f social psychological research need not necessarily
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dictate the normative limits o f human potential. For example, with respect to the Isen 
and Levin study that dealt with mood effects on helping behaviour, Miller argues,
Someone who defends the existence o f global character traits need only argue that most 
o f the test subjects did not receive an adequate moral education which habituated them 
into both recognizing and responding to the demands o f  the situation. If they had 
received such a training, then their activation thresholds would have been lower; they 
would not have needed the event o f finding a dime to trigger an internal feedback 
mechanism which disposed them to helping behavior. (2003, p.385)
Indeed, where individuals fail to meet the requisite experimental expectations 
for trait consistency, the question o f previous training and the adequacy o f the method 
o f character inculcation remains a non-trivial one; this is largely due to the fact that 
the achievement o f a fully developed character type is considered by many to be quite 
difficult to attain, and that it requires much effort and conviction. So the absence of 
trait-relevant behaviour has yet another alternative assessment available; namely, a 
lacking or poorly implemented program of character inculcation. Thus, even if  truly 
disconfirming evidence were produced, defenders o f character and virtue would 
retain the ability to stave off the findings of empirical research, at least until such 
research is performed on well trained subjects.
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2.5 An Incomplete Account of Character
Another important argument against situationism reveals that the kinds of 
experiments typically employed against character and virtue do not adequately 
capture the richness o f the concept of character as it is normally understood within 
virtue ethical theories. Indeed, such a position is taken by Kamtekar, who argues that, 
“traditional virtue ethics offers a conception of character far superior to the one under 
attack from situationism.. .the conception o f character in virtue ethics is holistic and 
inclusive o f how we reason: it is a person’s character as a whole (rather than isolated 
character traits), that explains her actions, and this character is a more or less 
consistent, more or less integrated, set o f motivations, including the person’s desires, 
beliefs about the world, and ultimate goals and values” (2004, p. 460). Kamtekar’s 
recognition that a more dynamic process o f practical reason is involved in motivating 
the actions o f the virtuous agent is consistent with Aristotle’s additional conditions, 
mentioned in the introduction o f this thesis (section 1.0), concerning knowledge and 
choice. Moreover, not only does it obtain a more comprehensive compatibility with 
Aristotelian views on virtue, but Kamtekar’s position allows for a conceptually richer 
understanding o f character, one that involves much more than is captured by the 
notions o f character provided within standard situationist accounts. For example, 
where situationists see some behaviours as simply counting against their limited 
concept o f character, views like Kamtekar’s allow for those behaviours to be assessed 
in light of the processes of reasoning proper to the individuals in question— and they 
are not taken to undermine character in any way. Indeed, according to Kamtekar,
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“traditional virtue ethics explains behavioural inconsistency as a result o f the 
cognitive and motivational obstacles to th[e] achievement o f practical reason rather 
than as the result of the absence of character traits” (2004, p. 460).
But what is meant by the term ‘practical reason’, and how is it impeded? 
According to Gary Weaver, practical wisdom (i.e. excellence o f a special kind of 
practical reasoning) is, “an actor’s ability to balance successfully the varied 
requirements o f virtue encountered in the different venues o f life— work, home, 
community, e tc.. .[it] involves skillful adjudication among th[e] virtues in light o f a 
general sense of ‘who I am’ as a moral agent” (2006, p.358). So the kind o f practical 
reason that we are concerned with demands that some deliberative effort be put into 
one’s choices regarding opportunities to act virtuously and how these relate to one’s 
self-concept— especially as concerns those opportunities that the agent immediately 
faces. And as with normal deliberation, there are multiple factors that may serve to 
aggravate the process; for example, time stress, an emotional disturbance, the 
presence of others, what one is attending to, et cetera.
Kamtekar’s understanding of traditional virtue ethics leads to a very different 
interpretation o f the current experimental results than the one provided by 
situationists. For example, rather than taking the actions of the participants in the 
Darley and Batson experiment as evidence against character, a person who sees 
things as Kamtekar does, would be much more likely to interpret the behaviour of 
those who did not help to be the result of the motivational impediment created by the 
time stress variable; this is not to say that the situational pressures did not play a role, 
but rather, that their impact upon behaviour does not directly disconfirm the existence
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of character. Notice that this actually allows for a much more comprehensive 
explanation of behaviour— since, for situationists, the fact that some people 
(statistical outliers) do help cannot be accounted for in terms o f situational factors yet, 
on Kamtekar’s view, the behaviour o f both helpers and non-helpers can be explained 
in reference to the degree of impact that cognitive and motivational impediments have 
on particular participants. Miller develops a similar position which he suggests, 
“avoids the extremes o f crude situationism and naive trait dispositionalism [i.e. naive 
endorsement of character based explanations o f action],” by taking the view that, “it 
is not situations alone which dictate action, but rather the ways in which we 
selectively focus on and characterize various aspects of them given our relatively 
fixed personality structures” (2003, p. 384). So what we are seeing with both 
Kamtekar and Miller is that there is a way in which the traditional notions of 
character and virtue can co-exist with the situation-sensitive findings from social 
psychology. Therefore, one need not assume that the two perspectives are necessarily 
incompatible.
A similar hybrid position known as ‘interactionism’ is also available in the 
field o f psychology proper. As Bern perhaps too optimistically claims, “The apparent 
contradiction between the personological view that behavior is person-determined 
and transsituationally consistent and the situationist view that behavior is situation- 
determined and context specific has now been resolved: We are all now 
‘interactionists’” (1983, p. 203). Regardless of whether or not this position has truly 
been widely adopted among researchers in psychology (based on my research this 
seems doubtful), it nevertheless represents a more balanced approach to the study of
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personality or character in reference to situational demands, and thus, it is a useful 
theoretical starting point for investigation into these matters.
The kind o f broader conceptual framework conceived o f by Kamtekar allows 
for a significant contribution to be made by situationism, since situationist research 
may help to identify the cognitive and motivational barriers to virtuous behaviour and 
the development and support o f moral character types. Indeed as Kamtekar notes, 
“virtue ethics can benefit from considering the particular situational factors that social 
psychology suggests have a profound influence on behaviour... [especially as 
concerns those].. .situations that do not wear their moral relevance on their sleeve but 
nevertheless seem to constrain how we act” (2004, p. 461). In other words, 
situationist research may help identify the influence upon behaviour o f various factors 
not typically recognized by the individual. Moreover, such research would help to 
secure predictions about group behavioural norms for various circumstances and, if  
accepting of an account o f character and virtue like the one advanced by Kamtekar, it 
would retain the advantage o f being able to explain the exceptions to those statistical 
norms as well.
Nonetheless, to remain prudent with regards to examining the findings of 
situationist research is advisable, since the popularly cited studies on helping 
behaviour recounted in the first section o f this paper (i.e. the Darley & Batson and 
Isen & Levin studies), as noted by Kamtekar, “were only carried out on about forty 
subjects, groups small enough to raise a question about how significant information 
could be distinguished from noise” (2004, p. 466 footnote). So researchers need to be 
sure to obtain adequate sample sizes, as well as have their studies replicated by other
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researchers before the results o f any particular study can be taken as representative of 
established truths about behaviour, or be evaluated and weighted as such. Also, 
philosophers and theoreticians need to be aware o f the experimental findings that lay 
in opposition to, or seem to contradict their findings and pet theories (e.g. Bern’s 
template-matching technique), since, as Miller argues, “it turns out that there is 
actually a great deal o f experimental evidence that.. .local traits not only exist but are 
in fact widely possessed” (2003, p. 382). These ‘local’ traits that Miller mentions may 
not meet what situationists take to be the needs o f traditional virtue theories— that is, 
they are not the robust characterological dispositions that might be expected—but, 
they nevertheless provide evidence in support o f the consistency o f certain aspects of 
character (albeit, in a more restricted sense). As such, they should act as a caution 
against hasty claims (like Harman’s), to the effect that there is no empirical support 
for character. Indeed, regardless o f their limited scope, such findings ought to 
encourage further research and more refined methodologies rather than simply be 
ignored or not recognized for what they in fact are: namely, character indexed 
examples o f behavioural consistency.
2.6 Situationist Social Psychology Forgets the Individual
Another important personal dimension that seems to be given little if  any 
attention by situationists, and the research programs that they reference, are the 
individual differences in the subjective construal o f the situation made by 
participants. Indeed, as Sreenivasan notes, “it is one o f the hallmarks o f situationism
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to privilege objective behavioural measures in the assessment o f character traits, at 
the expense o f various forms of subjective assessment favoured by traditional 
theorists o f personality— for example, self-reports, peer evaluations, and personality 
assessment scales” (2002, p.50). O f course, this appears reasonable at first glance, 
since the latter measures may not be the most reliable for predictive purposes, but it 
nevertheless results in a failure to account for the participant’s own interpretation of 
events. Thus, it would appear that social psychological researchers and situationists 
generally assume that simply because they identify the relevant features o f  an 
experimental setting in a certain way, that the participants will uniformly take the 
same interpretive perspective that they do. That is, that the participants will weigh 
various objective aspects o f the situation in exactly the same manner as the 
researchers. It would seem far more likely, however, that the participants—with their 
varying background knowledge and perceptual acuities—in fact do not always 
perceive the experimental context in the situationists’ desired fashion. Thus, as 
Kamtekar points out, “supposed inconsistencies in behavior may not be [subjectively] 
inconsistent at all” (2004, p.470). The following excerpt from Bern adds to the 
picture:
The more important conceptual point to be made here is that social-psychological 
theories.. .are, in fact, theories o f  situations, typically formulated without reference to 
individual differences. If personological theories have not lived up to expectations 
because they have limited themselves to person effects in a world populated by person- 
situation interactions, then we should be no more sanguine about theories that limit 
themselves to situation effects. (1983, p.207)
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So, just as the situationist may criticize the adequacy o f traditional personality 
constructs for finding behavioural consistency across situations, the personality 
theorist (i.e. advocate o f personality or character consistency), may challenge the 
adequacy o f social psychological research methods to identify and incorporate 
concerns related to individual differences and to take personality and character 
seriously.
In connection with these last points lies a related concern; namely, it is 
unclear just what are the situational forces deemed responsible by situationists for 
overpowering the internal dispositions (i.e. character) o f individuals. Indeed, as noted 
by Sabini & Silver, “the notion o f “situational forces” as an explanation.. .is not so 
much wrong as it is vague” (2005, p. 558). Before much sense can be made about the 
implications o f these situational forces their content needs to be precisely defined 
(and Bern [1983] boasts that template-matching could serve such an end).
To illustrate the problem that this vagueness creates for situationists, take for 
example the Isen and Levin study. For this study, the subjects who did help may not 
have been in any way influenced by the presence o f the dime in the payphone return 
slot, nor the presumed ‘good mood’ that the dime was taken to instill in them. Indeed, 
for a study construed as involving mood effects, surprisingly, nothing was known 
about the actual mood states of the participants, since these were not reported nor 
recorded in any way. Yet the mere finding of a dime was all that was required by the 
experimenters to justify the attribution o f a ‘good mood’ to a participant. Obviously, 
such attributions are highly suspect, since it could have been that those who did help
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were in bad moods, or neutral ones, regardless of their petty good fortune in finding 
the dime. Perhaps the phone call they had just made ended in an argument or 
conferred information about some other displeasing event; and yet, they may have 
helped not because finding a dime lightened their mood, but simply because they 
were taught good manners, or they so happened to have more compassionate 
character types than those who did not help. Indeed, it might even have been the case 
that those who did not help were in better moods than those who did help, since none 
o f the participants were subsequently asked to comment on what kind o f mood they 
were in prior to being involved in the experiment.
That such a serious oversight might occur in a study that is used as a 
prominent example o f the need for situationist views to replace traditional notions o f 
character inspires little confidence in the soundness o f the situationist position.
Rather, it seems to highlight the importance o f Miller’s suggestion that, “philosophers 
should exercise a great deal o f care when employing data from social psychology as 
independent evidence for their ethical claims.. .[and that the analysis o f such 
claims],. .should be carried out on a case-by-case basis” (2003, p. 392). Moreover, if  
these are the kinds o f studies that situationists take to be representative o f established 
trends in research, we have good reason to be skeptical that the body o f data upon 
which situationism relies raises any real concerns for character and virtue.
Indeed, even though there is good reason (a) to be cautious about making 
claims about character and virtue based upon the experimental results o f current 
studies in social psychology and (b) good reason to think that these research programs 
and the propositions regarding character which they motivate ought to be assessed on
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an individual basis, it would seem that most o f the experiments popularly cited by 
situationists suffer from a single overarching weakness. This weakness is that they 
rely almost exclusively upon the classification o f the observed behaviour o f 
participants as a whole, and typically ignore a wealth o f other potentially 
explanatorily powerful information from the individuals themselves. As noted by 
Kamtekar, such a singular focus produces an exclusionary effect wherein, “the 
character trait will [be taken to] determine behaviour in isolation from other character 
traits, thoughts, concerns, and so forth a person might have in a given situation”
(2003, p. 474).
But this approach to research is wrong headed since it proposes that, “people 
who possess a given trait are expected, to the extent that they possess the trait, to 
behave spontaneously and unreflectively in ways that manifest it on every occasion” 
(Kamtekar, 2003, p.474). What is important to this last quote is not, as was earlier 
noted, the situationists’ unreasonable expectation for a perfect behavioural record, but 
rather, that they also expect that the behaviours in question be accomplished without 
reference to the thinking individual. However, people are not simple automata: they 
each enter a situation with a particular set of background beliefs, attitudes, values, and 
assumptions. And these factors shape in part how a person construes and evaluates a 
given situation, as well as how they may behave within it. So for an experiment to 
reveal that a majority o f participants may behave in a certain way for a particular 
situation says nothing about the internal cognitive processes o f the individuals who 
produced the results. Part of the problem, as Sreenivasan sees it, is that, “the results of 
the [social] psychological research are reported at the level o f the population
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aggregate” (2002, p. 56). They fail to provide specifics about individual participants. 
Thus, it could be the case that, what appears to be the result o f a single situational 
variable is actually the result of numerous other factors unique to the varying 
experience and thoughts o f the individual participants. And further, such behaviours 
may even prove to be consistent with a particular character type when looked at from 
the perspective of the individuals themselves, where the individuals actually value the 
type of consistency in question for themselves.
The lacking detail allowed by such oversights in the experimental designs of 
studies often cited by situationists has prompted Kamtekar to suggest that, “rather 
than isolating character variables and testing for their manifestations in behaviour, 
social psychologists need to engage in more painstaking research that takes into 
account how the considerations experimental subjects have in mind might involve 
various character traits and how these might interact” (2003, p. 476). That is to say 
that, researchers should engage in dialogue with the individual participants with the 
aim o f understanding both the cognitive and motivational factors that may be at work 
in guiding their behaviours; and further, that such communication should be analyzed 
for signs o f character-relevant thought processes. Perhaps more importantly, as 
Kamtekar points out, for the most part4 “we should only expect people to behave 
consistently with traits which they deem important to have, or in areas in which 
consistent behaviour matters to them” (2003, p. 476). Otherwise, it seems that the 
situationists are guilty o f operating within the kind o f error that they claim to be
4 This method has its limits as well. In cases like pathological lying, someone could have the character 
trait o f  being a liar, yet they may deceive themselves about it and not report reliably about the trait 
even though the trait is present.
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trying to remedy— that is, the fundamental attribution error— since the experiments 
and interpretations that they employ rely upon the assumption that the participants 
should have the character traits in question before the results can confirm (on their 
account), that they in fact do not possess these traits. Indeed, it would appear much 
more cogent for the presumed characterological dispositions to be avowed by the 
participants to begin with, instead of operating under the assumption that people 
generally think they ought to have them, since the later track renders the current 
popular studies nothing more than examples o f the fundamental attribution error at 
work. As we have already seen in section 2.1, this specific tendency toward error 
cannot be taken to count against the existence o f character directly.
For Kamtekar, it is only when, “we have identified the particular traits and 
behaviours relevant to particular individuals, [that] we may [meaningfully] test for 
consistency correlations between traits and behaviours and among behaviors across 
situations” (2003, p. 477). And again, to acquire data for or against these kinds of 
correlations would require a more longitudinal type o f research program; that is, one 
that tracks the progress o f the same subjects across multiple trials. If these 
considerations were to be taken to heart in new research programs, then we would 
obtain much more compelling results, since not only would the tests track particular 
individuals to obtain global ratings; but these would be sensitive to the goals, values, 
and reasoning strategies of each unique individual. Furthermore, according to 
Kamtekar, “if one’s purpose is to evaluate virtue ethics, then the standard will have to 
be different [than the folk psychological one] and to take account o f the fact that we 
are thinking, goal-oriented creatures” (2003, p. 485). Indeed, where conceptions of
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character are operationally defined by psychologists, mere behavioural observations 
may satisfy their demands; however, when considering the richer concept o f character 
derived from Aristotelian thought, the background knowledge and reasoning o f the 
individual remain integral components to making sense of character.
There is more that is left to be said, however, about the social psychologists’ 
almost exclusive focus upon behaviour. One area o f warranted concern, as noted by 
Sreenivasan, is whether or not the, “behavioural measures [developed by 
psychologists] properly operationalize the character trait[s]” in question (2002, p. 57); 
for in some cases, the ways that traits are defined may have more to do with 
distinctions proper to the profession, than they do with distinctions that are relevant to 
virtue or common understandings o f character. Thus, the rule o f thumb should be— 
where the research is done with situationist concerns in mind— to stick as closely as 
possible to specifications o f character identified by the individual participants 
themselves. Moreover, according to Athanassoulis, “empirical evidence about 
outward behaviour alone, is not sufficient in order to draw inferences about the 
precise state o f character o f the agent” (2000, p.218). This is because, as Aristotle’s 
theory o f virtue suggests, agents may act similarly but from different motives and 
thoughts.
2.7 The Good Life and the Role of Practical Reason
It is important also to recognize that the virtues Aristotle spoke o f in the 
Nicomachean Ethics were an attempt to emphasize a certain manner o f orientation
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towards living that was thought to contribute to the ultimate goal o f attaining a good 
life. Thus, as Joel Kupperman sees it, “character can be viewed in terms of control 
mechanisms, which promote reliability in areas o f life in which reliability matters, 
and which would appear indispensable to a good life” (2001, p. 250). So the 
importance of behavioural consistency is established by the individual in relation to 
their assessment o f its value in regards to living a good life. Therefore, where the 
consistency of behaviour is seen to be o f no great importance to one’s living the good 
life, an individual may opt to disregard such demands. This is perfectly consistent 
with the aims o f virtue theory; since, as Maria Merritt suggests, “when virtue ethics 
does deal with problems o f how to act, it has arrived at them from the starting point of 
how one should live, and returns from them to that point” (2000, p. 370). However, to 
understand what makes a life a good one involves contemplation and reasoning; that 
is, one must come to understand, through deliberation and reflection, that one ought 
to value the virtues because, being virtuous contributes to having a good life. 
Moreover, Aristotle himself took the virtues to be, “modes o f choice or [to] involve 
choice” (Kaplan, 1958, p 188), and thus, to act virtuously involves not only the 
decision to value a virtuous way of life, but to be able to understand (i.e. have 
knowledge about) how one’s choices relate to virtue.
Understood in a certain light, these last considerations could seriously 
undermine the kinds o f situationist critiques of virtue that are derived from studies 
like the ones on obedience developed by Milgram. For example, suppose that some of 
the subjects of the Milgram experiments took themselves to be compassionate, and 
believed themselves in possession of this trait in a fairly robust sense (which is to say
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that they value consistently behaving compassionately). It is hard to imagine that 
anyone who would identify themselves to have such a trait would be willing to 
participate in a similar study ever again, much less so to grant full compliance if  they 
were expected to (unless perhaps they also believe themselves to be overwhelmingly 
disposed toward obedience). And this is at least in part because they would have a 
cognitive frame o f reference to guide their moral reasoning and behaviour for future 
instances o f a similar type; and with an adequate opportunity for reflection, such 
individuals could reason about their prior moral failings and resolve not to allow them 
to happen again. Indeed, if  the confederates in such experiments had really been 
shocked, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine that upon debriefing, participants who 
truly thought themselves compassionate, but failed to disobey in the first instance, 
would be inclined to repeat their actions in another set of trials. And this is another 
reason for inspiring confidence in the likelihood that the appropriate types o f 
longitudinal studies would find in favour of behavioural consistency given the 
necessary trial repetitions.
However, when the situationist position is fully elaborated, it is revealed that 
situationist conclusions are not only a threat to virtue and the notion of character, but 
also to common perceptions regarding the efficacy of practical reason. Nonetheless, 
they remain a threat that, so far, seriously lacks warrant. Kamtekar surmises the point 
well:
Perhaps, if  situationism is true, then the answer to the practical question “what can I do 
to take charge o f my situation?” is “nothing”— the features o f situations that determine 
behaviour are so subtle and surprising that no ordinary rational strategies could enable
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us to be masters o f  our situations. But such pessimism is premature, and i f  it were ever 
to become warranted, then it is not only virtue ethics and the notion o f character that 
we would have to jettison, but the power o f  practical reasoning. (2003, p. 491)
Indeed, it would appear that the situationists have a much greater task at hand 
in dispelling the efficacy of practical reason than they do in regards to challenging the 
adequacy o f personality constructs for determining behaviour. Surely, most would 
agree that they have not begun to touch upon the ways in which practical reasoning 
may be involved in directing behaviour. Moreover, without allowing room for 
reasoned responses to situations, it is difficult to imagine that the average individual 
has much to gain from situationist warnings— since it is unlikely that people caught in 
the trappings o f the current social reality could avoid things like being subjected to 
the demands o f higher-ups (i.e. authority figures: a boss, the police, et cetera), or 
finding themselves pulled in different directions by competing moral demands. For 
example, one might pass a stranded person on the highway but be conflicted about 
whether they should stop to help since they are already running late for a shift 
volunteering at a soup kitchen. Indeed, as Kamtekar notes, “as individual agents, we 
can’t just rig our situations or wait for our situations to be changed, we often have to 
act in and upon the situations we find ourselves in” (2003, p. 489). So the situationist 
suggestion to avoid situations within which we have little or no control over our 
behaviour— especially such situations as those derived from the experimental 
examples they provide— appears to be unrealistic since in many cases, we may truly 
be capable of doing no such thing.
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Furthermore, as was noted earlier, it is not always clear exactly what aspects 
of the situation are responsible for influencing behaviour; therefore, Sabini and Silver 
suggest that, “the advice the situationist gives—be sensitive to situational features 
that may affect your behavior in subtle ways— is [in regards to helping with ethical 
reflection,] useless, for the same reason that warnings about heightened terrorism 
threats are useless: they are unfocused; they warn people to be suspicious o f 
everything... without any hint as to what those [subtle situational] variables are” 
(2005, p. 561-562). So not only are people unlikely to be able to avoid certain 
situations but, when in those situations, they face the further difficulty o f not 
necessarily being able to identify the exact sources o f influence upon their behaviour; 
and thus, the prospect for mounting any kind of adequate strategy o f defense against 
these influences appears dismally bleak-—and likewise, the situationist warnings 
appear empty (i.e. lacking any real content).
2.8 Some Remarks on Situationist Thought and Characterological Thinking
Though it may be that the views expressed in this chapter raise serious 
concerns for the situationist stance, and challenge situationism on multiple fronts, this 
does not mean that the situationists are not picking up on something interesting or 
important. Indeed, as was noted earlier, situationist research may have implications 
for ethical theory—however doubtful be their position for the elimination o f character 
based views on virtue— in that it might help to identify subtle cognitive and 
motivational barriers to acting in step with what one takes to be their type of
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character. Nevertheless, the findings which motivate the situationists’ eliminativist 
project simply do not warrant views as bold as the ones they are advancing. Rather, it 
seems that the situationists have been over eager in extending their conclusions about 
the implications o f research for classical views on character and virtue, and have 
hastily generated claims far beyond what the limited range o f behavioural data should 
allow.
In the next chapter, I intend to broaden the scope o f the debate by venturing 
beyond behavioural research and into the more private realm o f what goes on 
cognitively when we think about character, the self, and others. This is done in the 
hopes o f expanding any reasonable perspective or treatment o f character to include 
such mentations. The next section relies heavily upon the mental space mapping 
theory known as ‘conceptual blending’, developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark 
Turner—and it is, in the first place, an exposition o f their theoretical framework, by 
way o f some examples that I have developed. After laying the groundwork o f their 
system, I will explore what it tells us about how we think in terms o f character and 
identity. Before elaborating in any greater detail, however, I will simply opt to 
transition into the next chapter of this thesis. But first, I call to the reader’s attention 
that, although it may not be apparent at the outset o f the next chapter just how the 
conceptual blending model addresses the problem of the existence o f character, one 
should, by the latter half o f section 3.3, be able to appreciate the kinds of 
contributions that such a model can make in regards to identifying the essential ways 
in which we make use of and understand the notion o f character. Also, in section 3.4,
I will explicitly state my personal views regarding the indispensability o f character
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concepts and the importance of conceptual blending to revealing just how valuable 
and important such concepts are.
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3.0 Integrating Conceptual Integration
Behind the seamless and effortless flow o f experienced mental phenomena lie 
some very intricate and complex cognitive processes. The mental space (i.e.
“cohesive packet o f conceptual information” Rohrer, 2005, p. 1690) theory dubbed 
conceptual blending (developed by Fauconnier and Turner [F&T]), attempts to 
explain some of these more elaborate and integrative cognitive processes. In this 
section, I will outline and explain what F&T consider to be the basic components of 
conceptual blending. I will also explain some of the core types o f  blends and their 
differences as well as illustrate what is involved in the process o f performing a 
conceptual blend. I will then explore the role of conceptual blending as it relates to 
our conceptions o f self and others in terms o f character and personality. Unless 
otherwise identified, all o f the examples used to highlight the ideas o f F&T are my 
own, and each o f the examples I have developed for this thesis are thoroughly 
compatible with the conceptual blending paradigm of F&T. Later, in section 3 .4 ,1 
will use the insights regarding the ways we think about character and personality 
provided by blend theory to challenge the situationist view that the concept of 
character ought to be abandoned.
Indeed, in addition to the rather compelling critiques o f situationism identified 
in the last chapter, there remains another way to challenge situationist suggestions by, 
in a sense, reshaping the problem of character. That is to say, perhaps instead of 
asking the question, “does character exist?” as the situationists seem to propose, what 
we should be asking, in regards to whether the concept o f character should be
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most would agree, after an examination o f the ideas and insights regarding how we 
think about character provided within this chapter, that the latter question should be 
answered with a resounding “yes!” As a result, contrary to the character eliminativist 
campaign of the situationists, I will argue that the notion of character should be 
retained, since it is useful for behavioural predictions or classifications, as well as 
having many positive implications for a number o f human practices, relations, and 
cognitive processes. But before getting into the reasons why we should not abandon 
the concept o f character, we need to develop a deeper appreciation for what goes on 
cognitively when we think in terms of character.
3.1 The Components of Conceptual Blends
Conceptual blending is a mental space mapping theory. A mental space, as 
was mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, denotes a unified conceptual bundle 
of information. According to F&T, such information bundles are, “constructed as we 
think and talk, for purposes o f local understanding and action” (2002, p. 40). That is, 
they allow us to make sense o f and react to our immediate perceptions and cognitions 
The information within these mental spaces is connected with long term memory; it 
can be connected both generally, in terms of ‘schematic frames’ (e.g. eating, talking, 
et cetera), and specifically. For example, the first time you tried sushi, or the 
conversation you had with Sally about politics several weeks ago. Mental spaces, 
according to F&T, contain various incomplete elements and are typically organized
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by general schematic frames. Various diagrams will be used to help clarify what is 
involved in conceptual blending in this thesis. Within these diagrams, mental spaces 
will be displayed as ellipses or circles; the elements o f mental spaces will either be 
listed or displayed as icons within the ellipses or circles; and the connection between 
elements will be shown as lines. The lines represent what F&T call ‘cross-space 
mappings’ which essentially denote connections between counterparts from various 
mental spaces. Shown in figure 3.1 are a mental space, and some possible elements of 
a mental space, both specific elements and general schematic 
elements.
Figure 3.1 Mental Space and Elements
A conceptual blend is composed o f two or more input structures, a generic 
space, and a fourth blended space. The input structures are simply mental spaces, and 
the generic space is a sort of schematic frame responsible for the initial partial
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mapping o f input structures. That is to say, the generic space contains those features 
or elements that are common among the input structures. Imagine, for example, a 
veteran champion figure skater responding, “I think I’m really only competing against 
myself out there,” after having been asked by a reporter, following a win at the World 
Championships competition, whether or not she was nervous about the strong 
performances o f some o f her competitors. The statement made by the figure skater 
may certainly evoke a conceptual blend; however, we will first examine how this 
statement relates to the blend components described so far. First, there may be two or 
more mental spaces evoked by such a statement (for the sake o f simplicity we will 
assume only two), perhaps, the skater’s winning performance at the World 
Championships on May 2nd o f 2005, and her recently earned win at the same 
competition on May 4th of the following year. The generic space, as shown in figure 
3.2, would contain the elements ‘figure skater’, ‘World Championships competition’, 
an unspecified ‘routine’, and a non-descript ‘day o f competition’, since these 
elements are common to both input structures.
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Generic Space
-Figure skater \ 
.-Routine* .. 









■Routine /  
-Competition 
■Date
Input Mental Space - 
World Championships 
2006
Input Mental Space - 
World Championship:
* (unspecified)
Figure 3.2 Input Mental Spaces, Generic Space and Connections
The blend is the result o f partial projections from the input structures into a 
fourth space. This fourth space is the blended space. O f this novel, fourth, blended 
space, Fauconnier claims, “Through pattern completion and dynamic elaboration, it 
develops an emergent organization o f its own” (2001, p. 256). In other words, the 
blend becomes a unique conceptual entity that contains greater content than that 
provided by either o f the input structures. Take for example, the blend that may be 
constructed in the mind o f a spectator who heard the statement made by the figure 
skater. For the spectator, the notion o f her ‘competing against herself may prompt a 
blend wherein the figure skater’s performance is evaluated against her performance 
from the same competition a year prior—and not only that, the blend allows the 
spectator to mentally create an impossible situation wherein the same figure skater
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from a year prior is conceived of as having literally competed against her more recent 
self. In the blend, the respective days of the competition are mapped onto a single 
non-descript day and so become fused; the locations o f the event, if  different for both 
inputs, are mapped onto a generic ‘arena of competition’, and are therefore 
compressed into a single place; the competition venue, because it is the same event, is 
fused, and becomes simply ‘The World Championships’; and the figure skater input 
elements resists being fused because the blend is made in reference to two separate 
performances, and thus, the unique performances and separation between figure 
skaters is preserved (even though we are actually only concerned with a single 
skater). The emergent structure of the figure skater competing against herself occurs 
within the blended space and is shown in figure 3.3.
Generic Space
-Figure skater \ 
,-Routine* . 









•Routine ̂  
•Competition 
•Date
Input Mental Space - 
World Championships
2006
Input MentafSpa.ce - 
World Championships
2005
'-Figure skater 1 sy *  
-Figure skater 2 /  
eWorld Championship: 
Competition 
-Dav of ev en t* / ,
(unspecified)
Blend
Figure 3.3 The Figure Skater Blend
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According to F&T, there are three main processes responsible for the 
emergent structure found within blends: composition, completion, and elaboration. 
Composition allows the blend to acquire additional structure that is not present in 
either o f the separate input spaces. It allows for this additional structure by 
establishing relationships between the input structures. For example, in neither o f the 
input spaces for the ‘Figure Skater’ blend do we find two performances by the same 
figure skater; however, within the blend there are two separate performances by the 
same skater (although within the blend the notion o f two skaters competing against 
each other is preserved because each version o f the skater is distinguished by her 
actual performance, and thus, as already stated, they resist being fused into a single 
person). It is the composition o f input structures that generates two distinct 
performances consisting o f two different routines at the same event on the same day. 
Completion, on the other hand, helps to generate emergent structure by organizing the 
blend elements along familiar schematic patterns (i.e. frames). For example, 
completion is responsible for importing the general ‘competition’ schema into the 
blend, and renders the separate ‘performance’ elements of the blend meaningful. In 
other words, completion, in part, establishes the appropriate relational context 
between blend elements that is necessary for the blend to make sense. Moreover, it is 
because of the organization of elements provided by completion that we are able to 
have the blend play itself out: in the blend, the figure skater is competing against 
herself. F&T call this the “running of the blend” and it is what is meant by the term 
‘elaboration’. Elaboration is a dynamic imaginative process that produces emergent 
structure based upon the configuration of the blend generated by completion. In
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neither o f the input spaces is the figure skater competing against herself, but when we 
run the blend, this is exactly what happens (i.e. it is what we envision).
Fauconnier also claims that, “The blend can be used to provide inferences, 
emotional content, rhetorical force, and novel conceptualization” (2001, p. 256). 
These various additional abilities afforded by conceptual blending go beyond what 
may be achieved by a simple comparison between input structures. In the ‘Figure 
Skater’ blend, the skater competing against herself is the ‘novel conceptualization’, 
and the blend allows one to infer which performance is superior regardless o f the 
judges’ scores for either o f the original events comprised within the input spaces. 
Within the blend, the actual judges’ scores for each o f the separate competitions do 
not matter because in neither case (i.e. in neither o f the actual events represented by 
the input spaces) did the judges’ rankings make reference to two separate 
performances by the same individual— if they had, we may expect the scores to have 
been different since such an occurrence could have changed the competition 
considerably. Therefore, it is not by simply comparing the two input spaces that we 
make sense o f the figure skater’s statement. Rather, it is by way o f performing a 
conceptual blend that we come to understand the meaning behind her stating that she 
was ‘competing against herself (i.e. trying to surpass her previous performance). In 
addition to the features o f conceptual blends just mentioned, Fauconnier considers the 
blended space to have, “A dynamic, coherent, life o f its own that is integrated and 
autonomous in ways that a mere alignment between structures is not” (2001, p. 278). 
Moreover, the ability o f conceptual blends to generate novel total conceptions is what
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distinguishes them as dynamic creative processes, and for F&T, such creative ways of 
thinking pervade human cognitive functioning.
3.2 Types of Conceptual Blends
There are four main types o f conceptual integration networks referred to by 
F&T: simplex, mirror, single-scope, and double-scope. An analysis o f these blends, 
by way of elaborating some of the practical examples I have developed, will help to 
elucidate conceptual blend theory and its structure mapping approach to 
understanding human thought. Also, such an analysis will reveal the way in which 
conceptual blends provide a comprehensive framework for understanding some 
complex cognitive processes— as will be shown later on in this thesis (section 3.3 & 
3.4), especially with respect to those processes involved in the ways that we think of 
character and personality.
Because simplex networks are not as involved in our conceptions of 
personality and character as are the more elaborate kinds of blends, we will begin our 
analysis by taking a look at what F&T call a mirror network. Within mirror networks, 
the inputs, generic space, and blended space all have the same organizing frame. The 
organizing frame serves to specify what is central to the activity, event, or subjects 
comprised in the blend. Within this type of network, the inputs are seen as mirroring 
each other because they all share the same organizing frame. Although the generic 
space and the blended space share the same organizing frame along with the inputs, 
there is often a sense in which the blend contains a richer, more developed structure
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than any o f the other constituents of the blend. For example, take the blend of, ‘the 
Kata’, wherein a karate student is performing a series o f physical strikes against a 
field of imaginary opponents. Within this blend, the common organizing frame is that 
o f a physical fight between people. The inputs are the karate student and several 
imaginary attackers. The more elaborate frame presented in the blend is that o f a 
karate student fighting off several attackers. The organizing frame provides a 
configuration for the elements o f the blend. If the inputs have the same organizing 
frame, they must also share a certain configuration that facilitates their connection. 
However, while the inputs o f a mirror network share a certain configuration, there 
may be important differences between them on a more specific level. In the Kata 
example, several inputs meet the role o f ‘combatant’ or ‘fighter’ in terms of the 
organizing frame, and they thus share a certain configuration. However, in a more 
specific way, one of the inputs fits the frame of, ‘the karate student fighting off 
several attackers’ and the other inputs more specifically fit the frame, ‘attackers o f the 
karate student’.
Mirror networks are capable o f blending a variety o f inputs, so long as the 
said inputs have the same organizing frame. At the level of the organizing frame, 
there is no discordance found between inputs. However, at a more specific level 
below the organizing frame, the incongruence of the projected input spaces becomes 
clear. The karate student and the attackers differ in regards to their actual existence— 
the karate student being an actually existing individual, while the various attackers 
are fictions. There are two basic ways that blends dissolve incongruence between 
inputs according to F&T. The first way is to project only one o f the incongruous
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elements into the blend. For example, in the Kata blend, the karate student and the 
attackers fit the frame, ‘fighting people’ and these projected elements are fused within 
the blend. However, on a more specific level, there is incongruence between the 
inputs with respect to the element of ‘actual existence’, and only actual existence is 
projected into the blend. Another way to resolve the specific level incongruence 
between elements is to incorporate them within the blend. For example, in the Kata, 
the inputs share the same frame element ‘person’ or ‘fighter’, but there is an 
important way in which the inputs resist being fused within the blend. Rather than 
being fused into a single unity, as shown in figure 3.4, the more specific elements of 
‘attacker’ and ‘karate student’ are both incorporated into the blend to yield, ‘people’ 









-Karate Student , 
fighting off attackers
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Figure 3.4 Mirror Network: The Kata Blend
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For F&T, mirror networks (as well as other types o f blends), may perform 
what they label ‘compressions’ upon various components o f a blend, such as time, 
space, identity, role, cause-effect, change, intentionality, and representation (i.e. what 
they call, ‘vital relations’). A compression is a sort of combination o f apparently 
remote cognitive elements which results in the object o f the compression being 
understood as a distinct unit. Or as Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley describe it, “the 
term compression is used to describe an entity in a blended space that has distinct 
counterparts in multiple input spaces, and, moreover, those counterparts are related to 
one another via a vital relation...the relationship that allows us to draw mappings 
between elements in different mental spaces can be “compressed” so that a single 
element in a blended space simultaneously represents all o f its counterparts in the 
various input spaces in the network” (2005, p. 1533). For example, within the Kata 
blend, the vital relation o f ‘space’ is compressed, from an actual space where the Kata 
is taking place and an imagined space where attackers are advancing on the student, 
to a single space wherein the student is visualizing and reacting as if  fighting off 
actual attackers.
Mirror networks render compressions especially easy due to the agreement 
between organizing frames; but compression remains a central activity to blends in 
general, according to Joseph Grady, who claims that, “one o f the most fundamental 
principles guiding the creation of new, figurative conceptualizations is the 
‘compression’ o f relations holding across input spaces (i.e. ‘outer space relations’), 
into simpler configurations in the blend” (2005, p. 1603). In addition to this process 
so typical o f blends in general, one may also decompress the frames or input elements
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to regain a perspective o f the constituent spaces of the blend. Moreover, 
decompression, or ‘disintegration’, is just as important as compression is to the 
blending process— since, as Anders Hougaard (2005, p 1653-1685), and Carl Bache 
(2005, p. 1615-1635), suggest: before the various combinatorial processes o f blends 
become active, the extraction of various cognitive elements from other conceptual 
unities must first occur. Thus, compression and decompression/disintegration appear 
to be equally involved in, and equally invaluable component processes o f conceptual 
blending in general.
For F&T, there is an important reason why such processes occur—to achieve 
what they call ‘human scale’. For F&T, we are, “evolved and culturally supported to 
deal with reality at [a] human scale” (2002, p. 322); that is, we have developed to 
“have direct perception and action in familiar frames that are easily apprehended by 
human beings.. .[which] typically have very few participants, direct intentionality, 
and immediate bodily effect and are immediately apprehended as coherent” (2002, p. 
312). In short, human scale can be understood as a designator for an instantaneously 
clear and uncomplicated grasp o f various elements. Some o f the benefits o f attaining 
human scale, according to F&T, include: the acquisition o f global insight, the 
reinforcement o f  vital relations, the combination o f numerous elements into a single 
representative, and the ability to understand narrative cohesiveness (p. 312). As will 
be seen in section 3.4, these last points are deeply related and important to how we 
think about character.
A further type o f conceptual blend is a single-scope network. What defines a 
single-scope network is that the input spaces contain two different organizing frames
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yet only one o f the organizing frames is projected into the blend. The idea o f 
completing a puzzle provides a lucid frame for our understanding the work of a 
detective. Indeed, when engaged in working upon a certain case we might say the 
detective is putting together the pieces of a puzzle. To assume this type o f perspective 
is to perform a conceptual blend wherein an alignment takes place between the inputs 
but only one o f the input frames is projected into the blend, in this case the frame, 
‘completing a puzzle’. The input, ‘detective working on a case’ and the, ‘person 
solving a puzzle’ input are connected along the lines of, the puzzle solver to the 
detective, the assembly and organization of the puzzle pieces to the assembly and 
arrangement o f evidence and clues within the case, and the completion o f the puzzle 
to the solving o f the case. In this example, the ‘completing a puzzle’ frame provides 
the configuration for the elements of the blend, and there is only one person focused 
upon resolving a problem.
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Figure 3.5 Single Scope Network: Puzzle Solving Detective Blend
Double-scope networks differ from single-scope networks primarily in the 
sense that, for double scope networks, the inputs not only commonly have 
incongruous frames, but also, two of the organizing frames provide important 
structural elements to the frame o f the blend. However, the frame o f the blend will 
have some additional structure o f its own. The incongruity o f the input frames allows 
for some imaginative work to be done in the construction o f the blend and may thus 
result in some highly creative and novel conceptualizations. A simple example o f a 
double-scope blend would be, ‘talking over dinner’. Such a blend involves two 
distinct conceptual frames that are partially integrated in an appropriate way to make 
sense o f the scenario. One o f the input frames is ‘talking’ and the other is ‘eating’.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
These two frames are structurally incongruous, and they designate normally non­
overlapping functional roles. However, as shown in figure 3.6, within the blend we 
can imagine individuals engaged in a discussion throughout a meal, thanks in part to 
the characteristics provided by each of the frame inputs, along with the additional 
provisions of etiquette as emergent structures o f the blended frame. If  the dinner 
discussion took place while watching television, it is perhaps not too difficult to 
imagine how this combined set o f activities could be used as a prompt for the 
formulation o f a multiple blend. Multiple blends may contain several different frames 
and generic spaces, some o f which may even be partial blends themselves.
Generic Space
M\vo people in \  
close proximity










Figure 3,6 Double Scope Network: Talking over Dinner
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The examples I have used to illustrate the three main types o f conceptual 
blends mentioned above should provide a general idea of how multiple blends may 
work. For this reason, and because a deep understanding o f multiple blends is not 
crucial to the aim o f this thesis, I would like to shift the focus towards the 
implications o f conceptual blending theory as it relates to character and identity in the 
following section.
3.3 Characters and Blends
There are many examples to be found in popular literature and film that 
provide a global image o f a given character’s predictable dispositions and behaviours 
within various situations. Most any lead role in a modem film will serve as an 
example that provides viewers with a general conceptual construct o f that character’s 
typical forms of behaviour. When one of these characters is faced with a novel 
situation, we may be left thinking that their behaviour was so typical o f them. 
Moreover, such characterological conceptual entities have the ability to remain 
recognizable regardless o f the organizing frame they are a part of. In other words, we 
can imagine how a certain character may react in a given context regardless o f 
whether or not we have ever witnessed their behaviour in such a situation. Restated, 
just as an organizing frame may remain intact regardless of the characters that it 
encompasses, character identity may remain conceptually intact regardless of the 
frame that organizes it.
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In many blends, it is important that a complete conception o f a certain 
character be imported into the blend. For example, a detective may imagine that she is 
an infamous serial killer such as Jeffrey Dahmer in order to attempt to understand the 
mind o f a serial killer with similar characteristics, perhaps a copy-cat killer, that she is 
currently engaged in pursuing. The detective does not simply import what is known 
about Jeffrey Dahmer’s character but she also projects into the blend what he would 
do next if  he were responsible for the crimes she is investigating. Indeed, ‘getting into 
the mind,’ understood as assuming the identity o f whomever or whatever one is 
pursuing or confronting, is a common practice to many different activities, from 
hunting to the game o f chess, that allows for various predictions to be made. The 
mere fact that appeals to character in common parlance are understandable suggests a 
general acceptance o f the existence o f such an underlying character. Indeed, F&T 
claim, “Characters, like frames, are basic cognitive cultural instruments. We may 
dispute every aspect o f their accuracy or legitimacy or invariance, or even their very 
existence, but cognitively we cannot do without them” (2002, p.250). In other words, 
characterological conceptualizations are indispensable features o f human cognitive 
processes; and they are deeply relevant to a myriad of different ways in which we 
construct and perceive meaning. More will be said about what this means for 
situationism later on (in section 3.4).
Inherent to the development of the three core types o f conceptual blends 
addressed in this paper is a focus upon the organizing frames. Indeed, the three main 
types o f blends were essentially defined in terms of frame relations across inputs, the 
generic space, and the blended space. However, for F&T, character and identity are
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just as important as frames are to our ways o f thinking. For example, take a teenager 
who was humiliated by a prank in front o f his peers. In conveying the story to an 
older sister who was not present at the time o f the occurrence, the older sister may 
react by responding, “If  I were you, I ’d get them all back double.” In this blend, we 
have the organizing frame of, ‘repaying a prank’ along with a blended concept o f the 
person who is to repay the prank. In the blend, the person has the identity o f the 
teenage boy and his characteristic anger for having been humiliated, but also has the 
vengeful disposition o f the older sister. In this last example, the blend has a single 
organizing frame; however, as stated earlier, character may remain intact even when 
transported into different frames. For example, the statement, “Would you trust him 
to pack your parachute?” may serve to highlight an individual’s character in a novel 
frame. In this scenario it is irrelevant that neither the person addressed, nor the person 
referred to, have ever gone parachuting. What is important is that casting this 
particular character into this blended frame provides a compression o f external 
features that allows for a global perspective o f the character’s reliability and 
trustworthiness that is not dependent upon the organizational frame that the character 
is placed within. This example serves to show how conceptual blending plays a key 
role in the development o f notions o f the cross situational stability o f character, since 
it provides the means for a global conception of an individual’s character that is 
unmarred by the specifics o f context.
One o f the ways that conceptual blending contributes to the development o f a 
coherent construct for an individual character is by producing a generic space for that 
individual. By observing a character’s reactions within different settings, we are able
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to obtain a unified view o f that character’s standard behaviour. Notice that this kind 
of aggregation o f behavioural observations from diverse situations is precisely what 
was recognized in the second chapter (section 2.1) of this thesis to be important to 
making more confident and warranted ascriptions o f character. Here, this unified 
view of a character is manifested within the generic space delegated to the character.
It is also possible, according to F&T, to create a generic space for a type o f person; 
for example, the liar, the proud, or the credulous individual. Such a generic space is 
built up from regularities across the behaviours of people who fit the classification. 
Moreover, it would appear that, when people commit the fundamental attribution 
error, what is happening is that those committing the error are conceptualizing 
another in terms o f such generic classifications, and that this is occurring with 
insufficient observational cues to warrant such attributions. Thus, a reasonable 
response to such a problem is not to abandon the notion o f character as the situationist 
would suggest, but rather, to emphasize that the degree of confidence which can be 
accorded to a character attribution is directly proportional to the amount and 
distribution of previous behavioural observations made of the individual in question.
From an analysis o f some of the ways that blends relate to conceptions of 
character, F&T have derived a set o f three principles, “To clarify a single frame, fill it 
with different essential characters; to clarify the relationship between frames, fill 
them with the same essential character; and to clarify essential character, transport it 
across different frames.” (2002, p. 252). These principles serve to show how different 
blends can be used to emphasize central features o f either organizing frames or 
character. However, there is a further aspect of conceptual blending that allows
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blends between characters or the blending of a character with a frame. In the, 
‘Detective Dahmer’ example mentioned earlier, the character spaces for both the 
detective and Jeffrey Dahmer are fused into a single conceptual entity. Such a blend 
may be prompted by the detective asking herself, “If I were Dahmer, what would I do 
next?” The detective’s projection into the blend o f Dahmer’s character, derived from 
a deep knowledge o f his history, need not be perfectly accurate. Rather, what is 
important to the blend is that it grants the detective certain relevant and valuable 
insights into her current problem. Performing such a character blend has the 
remarkable ability to actually generate novel and useful ideas, or render apparent 
various ways o f approaching a certain problem not available to the subject outside of 
the blend. This blend is a mirror network, if  understood in terms o f  the organizing 
frame. However, if  understood in terms o f the characters, it is a double-scope blend, 
due to the radically different character components associated in the blend. Blends of 
the, ‘If I were you ,...’ sort, such as the one provided in the, ‘Embarrassed Teenager’ 
example, provide a common and obvious portrayal o f integration between characters.
There is a further sense in which conceptual blends may provide insight into 
one’s own typical dispositions. Such blends can act as a means o f redemption, 
achieving vengeance, and redeeming honor. For example, imagine a mother hearing 
that her adult son is being pushed around by a boss at work and replying,
“Do you remember when you were in primary school and the bullies pushed you 
around? Do you remember submitting to their commands? That’s exactly what you 
are allowing to happen with your boss. You’ve recounted all the ways that he has
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taken advantage o f your unquestioning obedience, but you’ve failed to realize that he 
is bullying you. Once again, you are cowering to a bully.”
In this blend, the input, ‘cowering to bullies’ is imported from the character’s 
childhood and it provides the organizing frame for the blend. The, ‘cowering to 
bullies’ frame provides the configuration for the relationship between the character 
and his boss. However, there remains a deeper more subtle psychological richness 
and unity to the character within the blend. In fact, this psychological unity is part of 
the point o f the mother’s statements. Furthermore, the mother’s comments are 
directed at the adult son who is being bullied, and thus, he is required to perform a 
double-scope blend that integrates his identity from two different time periods. The 
adult being pushed around by a boss is blended to the child being pushed around by 
schoolyard bullies. The blend is a way of getting at a characterological behavioural 
disposition that is only evidenced within actual situations. Cowering to a boss and 
cowering to bullies are clear examples of manifested behaviour. Such blends, for 
F&T, provide us with a general psychological principle, “Outer-space vital relations, 
often connecting a person in one space to himself in another, can be compressed into 
inner-space character traits understood to be part o f the essence o f  the person” (2002, 
p. 259). In other words, one’s typical behaviours across situations are conceptually 
unified as a core aspect o f the individual’s character.
The way that such a blend provides an opportunity for redemption is by 
drawing a parallel between situations and treating them as equivalent. Understood in 
terms of the organizing frame, the ‘Bully Boss’ example just recounted is a mirror
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network. The ‘son’ character in this blend is presented with an opportunity to stand 
up for himself within the new workplace situation. Success in the new workplace 
situation has the effect of shaping the character to have overcome his former 
cowardice; that is to say, it allows the individual to conceive o f him self as having 
undergone noticeable character development (development that situationism would 
likely misapprehend as merely behavioural inconsistency). In terms o f the original 
inputs, no changes have taken place. However, within the blend, the two situations 
are fused, and because the core character projection is derived from the adult son, his 
successful negotiation o f the workplace scenario redeems his character from the 
earlier cowardice. From the perspective of his new success in standing up to his boss 
at the workplace, motivated by the blend, his earlier cowardice seems merely an 
interruption to the newly formed character trait of courage. It may appear awkward 
that the success in one setting should redeem the failure to take positive action in 
another. The input spaces remain objectively unchanged; however, his new successful 
action restores his integrity and allows him to conceive himself as having overcome 
his childhood inadequacies. Indeed, F&T claim, “No one is deluded: The old failure 
stands as unchangeable history. But in the integration network, the psychological 
context and weight o f that failure are completely changed” (2002, p. 260). Moreover, 
it seems that this is precisely the kind o f reevaluative mental process one might 
expect to see involved in the gradual progression o f the average individual towards a 
more firmly fixed virtuous disposition— in this case, as concerns the trait of 
courage— as has been described by virtue theory proponents. Note well: the Bully 
Boss example is not so much about predictive success as it is about self­
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transformation grounded in a character based interpretation o f past events. Moreover, 
even if longitudinal studies called into question the existence o f global character 
traits, local character traits used in blends would be sufficient for the type of 
redemption and transformation considered in this example.
Fauconnier and Turner argue that, although we can construe a blend in terms 
of either the frames or the characters, there is no perfect formula as to how to 
assemble these components for any particular blend. For them, though language may 
provide some terms for the neat compartmentalization o f concepts, there is no sense 
in which characters and frames are ever completely dissociated. In other words, 
character identities are always somewhat related to certain frames, and frames are 
always somewhat connected to certain types o f characters. For example, the Dahmer 
character o f the earlier blend is not someone easily dissociated from the, ‘murder’ 
frame. There is a sense in which the blend transforms him partially into a detective; 
however, he could never be fully divorced from the ‘murder’ frame. Similarly, the 
‘murder’ frame is connected to various individuals who have committed such acts. 
Indeed, F&T suggest that, ‘‘There is no limit to the amount o f detail in frames or 
identities, and at the neurocognitive level o f activations, frames and characters are 
always intertwined” (2002, p.262). In other words, the spaces that compose the blend 
are structurally diffuse and they intermingle.
Conceptual blends are not restricted to character manipulations of only living 
or present people. Indeed, there are many possible material anchors that may evoke a 
sense of communion with lost ones and the departed, such as, pictures, letters, and 
gravesites. These and other items may prompt an individual to create a blend wherein
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a missing or dead person is conceived o f as being fully present and alive, and 
intentionally interacting with the individual. One may create a blend when visiting a 
tombstone that invokes the advice or encouragement o f a deceased grandparent, or 
allows the individual to relay an expression o f sadness for their absence. According to 
F&T, there is nothing spooky about such a mentation. When an appreciation o f the 
psychological aspects o f such mental acts is achieved, it becomes clear that the absent 
character is imported into the blend from long-term memory and connected to a 
current situation. F&T consider these, ‘nonpeople’ (i.e. absent or deceased people), to 
be capable o f occupying a blend with equal richness and complexity to familiar 
characters that are still breathing.
As one may gather from the examples provided within this section, conceptual 
blending is a process that is deeply involved in our thinking about ourselves and 
others. In the next section, I will use the insights gathered from what conceptual blend 
theory has to say about the way we understand character to challenge the eliminativist 
situationist position, a position I will also refer to as strong-situationism.
3.4 Situationism in Light of Conceptual Blending
According to Harman, we should abandon the notion o f character; doubtless, 
his Business Ethics Quarterly journal entry entitled, “No Character or Personality”, is 
a telling enough sign in regards to the reasons why he thinks we ought to do so. But, 
beyond the inadequate support he has provided for his position lies an even more 
suspicious set o f speculative claims. Indeed, he has gone so far as to suggest that our
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conceptions o f character are responsible for, “disastrous effects on people’s 
understanding of each other, on [our] understandings o f what social programs are 
reasonable to support, and [on our] understandings o f international affairs.” (2000b, 
p. 224). Interestingly, he does not hold himself to a similar standard o f empirical 
support for these claims as he demands for character based notions, even though they 
appear to be far more incendiary and controversial. Moreover, he does not do much 
by way of elaborating as to just how, or in what sense, possessing a concept o f 
character is responsible for these supposed calamities. Rather, it seems his argument 
is more centrally concerned with the errors we incur when we make character 
attributions with insufficient warrant.
With regards to his aforementioned belief (section 1.5) that characterological 
thinking has negative consequences for political deliberations, the problem is not that 
we think in terms o f character, but simply, that we often make faulty or irrelevant 
character attributions. Since, for example, the ‘French Bill Clinton’ blend o f Coulson 
and Oakley (2005, p. 1514), shows the former President’s political loss o f grace (in 
regards to the Lewinski affair), to be due to cultural taboo’s more than an inability to 
lead (i.e. his having an incompetent type of character). But to say that we make hasty 
or faulty character judgments is not to say that the underlying conceptual basis o f our 
judgments is ultimately false. Indeed, the ‘French Bill Clinton’ blend (prompted by 
the statement: “In France, the Lewinsky affair wouldn’t have hurt Clinton” (2005, p. 
1514)) can be seen as a positive example of how to isolate the kinds o f irrelevant 
cultural biases from our thoughts on character that confound rational assessments of
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an individual’s ability. And so, even within the political sphere, character conceptions 
can be useful.
That is not to say that Harman is completely off track, and that all kinds of 
thoughts on character are beneficial to political reasoning— as was noted at the outset 
o f this thesis they most certainly are not—-but neither do all characterological 
ideations regarding political matters end in negative results. Thus, the more 
reasonable course of action appears to be not to abandon the concept o f character, but 
instead, to work towards developing measures for guarding against hasty, faulty, and 
irrelevant attributions o f character. Indeed, rather than the question o f whether or not 
character exists, it is these specific error laden tendencies regarding the attribution of 
character that appear to be most central to the concerns raised by Harman. And more 
broadly, it is these tendencies that are of concern to the warranted attribution o f 
character in general.
My primary objection to Harman’s views (and to any situationally motivated 
view for character eliminativism, including Doris’ slightly less brash approach), is the 
idea that we ought to abandon all talk and thought of character—what I call the 
strong-situationist stance— and the notion that any such talk or thought holds only 
negative consequences for human interactions and decision making. Indeed, I think, 
along with F&T, that our understanding of character is a rich and deep process— one 
that is partially responsible for many positive outcomes and is essential to how we 
make sense o f both ourselves and others; and further, that it is an indispensable aspect 
of how we think.
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Contrary to Harman’s ominous warning that character based thoughts have 
“disastrous” effects upon how we think about each other, it seems that it is the 
concept o f character that, in part, allows us to develop an understanding o f ourselves 
and others, and to envision individual people as having coherent personal identities. 
Of course, we may make faulty predictions about an individual’s trustworthiness or 
reliability (or some other character trait), in certain circumstances, due to the fact that 
we were either too quick to attribute a certain virtuous character type to the 
individual, or because we failed to notice the kinds o f pressures involved in the 
situational context which the individual faced, or even because certain 
characterological conceptions may ultimately fail as predictive tools for behaviour. 
Nevertheless, characterological thinking remains an indispensable tool for making 
sense o f individual people, as well as their goals and values, and the actions relevant 
to them. It remains indispensable even if our understanding o f character only makes 
sense retrospectively and not projectively; and this is so because character types, like 
people in general, change and grow, and develop and disintegrate over the course o f a 
lifespan; therefore, we should never approach the task of making character based 
predictions without some reservations. But in order to extract some kind o f personal 
meaning from an individual’s existence, there needs to be some way of unifying the 
elements o f their life into a coherent structure— one not unlike what may be 
achievable through the process o f compression to human scale found in conceptual 
integration networks (i.e. conceptual blends). Indeed, although the insights afforded 
by such compressions may appear to be of value only retrospectively, they do provide 
a global image of character. As such, they are likely (and reasonably so) to confer
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increased predictive confidence in regards to a given individual’s behaviour, even if 
such predictions remain an imperfect empirical endeavour.
Consider the Detective Dahmer blend example provided earlier. Within the 
blend, the detective draws upon a wealth of character data in order to gain some fresh 
insight as to what some o f the potential next moves o f the suspect might be. It is 
unclear that any appreciation o f the situational context prior to the murder could 
provide fruitful leads as to the murderer’s next move (barring o f course ordinary 
forensic details), since, presumably, many people have been in similar or identical 
situations and have not murdered anyone. Indeed, in this scenario, we are not dealing 
with an isolated behaviour evoked by a specific situational factor. Rather, it seems 
quite clear, both intuitively, and based upon past case details, that a serial killer is in 
some way disposed to continue killing regardless o f the subtle specifics o f the pre­
murder situation. Thus, the Detective Dahmer blend (i.e. an example of 
characterological thinking), appears to be a useful and beneficial way o f 
conceptualizing events, one that may provide some very original and rewarding leads, 
and assist in the capture o f a serial killer. Others have also commented upon the 
practical value o f character blends; for example, Coulson and Oakley claim that,
“even though cognitive models in blended spaces are occasionally bizarre, the 
inferences generated inside them are often useful and lead to productive changes in 
the conceptualizer’s knowledge base and inferencing capacity” (2005, p. 1515).
Indeed, as in the Detective Dahmer example just mentioned, this kind of character 
blend allows for greater insight into the mind o f a serial killer, and it also allows for 
some creative inferences to be drawn regarding some o f the potential next moves of
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the suspect. Moreover, many of these blend generated inferences may not be available 
from outside o f the blended mental space. Thus, we have good reason to retain the 
notion o f character, regardless o f how some situationists might construe the results 
from various social psychological studies. In the examples considered, the research 
employed for situationist ends does not address the issue at hand (i.e. how best to 
proceed), and thinking in terms of character in such cases can prove to be exceedingly 
valuable.
Consider next, the Embarrassed Teenager blend example mentioned earlier. 
For this blend, the situational specifics are not central to the vengeful sister’s thoughts 
on behalf o f her brother (other than the obvious fact that a prank was executed at his 
expense), nor does it seem likely that explaining the event in terms o f situational 
factors would reduce the sympathetic thoughts and feelings o f the sister to null. 
Furthermore, there is no mention o f any specific behaviour on the part o f the 
embarrassed teenage brother that requires a situation based explanation. And even if 
one wanted to construe his embarrassment as a type o f behaviour, in some tortured 
attempt to bring situational concerns back into the picture, it would be o f negligible 
value, since his embarrassment is only a trivial and subsidiary component o f the 
conceptual blend (i.e. what is going on cognitively). The sister’s claim that, “If  I were 
you I ’d get them all back double!”, betrays an aspect o f her character, and possibly 
something about the kind o f personality her brother has as well. Perhaps the statement 
was motivated by, and the blend partially composed of, the sister’s knowledge of her 
brother’s typically passive disposition; thus, the statement could be meant as a 
rallying cry to motivate her brother to do something about what had happened to him.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
Otherwise, the assertion may have been about what is typically more defining of her 
own character or personality—namely, to seek vengeance. Regardless o f what may be 
the underlying motivation for the blend, it involves both character spaces as inputs.
So by bringing to mind such types of character thoughts, one is also evoking some 
rather detailed background information about the individuals involved, for example, 
as concerns their typical behavioural, attitudinal, and interpretational characteristics.
These kinds o f blends play a vital role in supporting and promoting social 
cohesion as well as providing an outlet for deeper insight into the self. Indeed, as 
evidenced by the Embarrassed Teenager example, blends o f the “If  I were you...” 
type seem inevitably to involve an appreciation o f either the character o f the one for 
whom the blend is invoked, or o f the person invoking the blend (i.e. one’s self). Such 
character dependent cognitions (i.e. character blends), appear vitally important to 
establishing bonds o f empathy, sympathy, and understanding between individuals, 
since they are essentially a way of getting at what it is like to ‘walk a mile in someone 
else’s shoes’ (i.e. assume the perspective o f another). This may be done both in terms 
o f developing a sort o f cognitive appreciation of the circumstances another finds 
themselves within, as well as getting a sense of what may be their emotional status in 
response to the said circumstances. Thus, contrary to Harman’s suggestion that 
character conceptions ought to be abandoned due to their widespread negative 
consequences; it seems that here, rather, we have reason to be quite optimistic about 
thinking in terms o f character, since the kind of blends just mentioned show how 
beneficial such ways o f thinking can be. Indeed, such examples seem to support the
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idea that characterological conceptualizations are indispensable features o f our 
thought as well as deeply implicated in many positive aspects o f social cohesion.
One may imagine many other positive examples wherein character forms an 
important aspect o f our thought—thoughts which may lead to beneficial and useful 
consequences. Indeed, the other examples o f blends I’ve developed in the earlier 
sections of this chapter could serve just such an end. For example, within the ‘Bully 
Boss’ blend explained earlier, the son (victim/employee) was provided with a 
remarkable means o f achieving a sense o f accomplishment— a sense o f having 
overcome former inadequacies in the establishment o f a newfound positive personal 
quality. Both in terms of social appraisal and as pertains to the individual himself, 
such an achievement is seen as a kind of redemption. But the notion o f redemption 
only makes sense in reference to some sort o f continuous unity—a unity that, in this 
case, was achieved by way o f an appreciation for the characteristic reactions to 
certain kinds o f events (i.e. those wherein the son was ‘pushed around’ by others), 
that the individual seemed to find himself faced with time and again; and it is only by 
way of internalizing these common experiences and reactions as a part o f his 
character that the individual is capable o f understanding both his mother’s concern 
and the effect that standing up for himself would have upon his confidence, self­
esteem, and self-image (i.e. the kind of character he takes himself to have).
It is crucially important, in this last example, for the son to be able to 
understand himself as a coherent whole; that is, as having an identity (or character) 
that persists through time. Otherwise, his pattern o f past reactions may be 
unrecognized by him, and if he reacts differently in one instance it may have no real
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bearing on his understanding of himself. In other words, for him to change his 
behaviour from passive to self-assertive would be just that— a change in his 
behaviour— and it would bear no relevance to his growth or progress as an individual. 
This change would be as a mere blip on the screen, indistinguishable from any other 
but simply different. And although the situationist project may be primarily a 
descriptive one, it is unclear that any benefit would come from the prescriptions that 
situationism could make in regards to his predicament. Should he take Harman’s 
advice and, “head the situationist slogan, ‘People! Places! Things!’” (2003, p. 90)? 
Such advice merely amounts to the suggestion to stay away from bullies and to stay 
away from one’s boss. Surely, this would be no great comfort since bullies are not 
always easy to avoid, even less so when one works for them. Are things therefore 
hopeless for the son, since the situational forcefulness o f being in the presence of 
bullies seems to have always rendered him a coward? It seems to me that all hope is 
not lost, and rather, the son may develop the appropriate behavioural tools for 
handling confrontations, or merely identify his own shortcomings and make a firm 
decision not to cower to bullies any longer. But as was already stated, such a self- 
identification requires that one understand oneself as a coherent unity. So again it 
appears, contrary to Harman’s speculations, that thinking in terms of character can 
have a positive role to play for the individual; and more than that, in this last example, 
it appears to be o f much greater use and value than any situationist take on things (by 
providing normative guidance). In this case, the situationist warnings appear not only 
out o f place, but utterly useless.
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Character blends involving ‘nonpeople’, a type that was mentioned earlier, 
provide another example o f how thinking in terms of character can end in positive 
results. For example, similar to Athanassoulis’ (2000) notion o f the ideal virtuous 
person, an individual facing a moral dilemma may invoke the advice o f a lost loved 
one whom they took to be a moral exemplar through a blend in order to help them 
resolve the difficulty. Evoking character blends o f deceased loved ones may also help 
to provide comfort and relief throughout the grieving process by providing, in a 
sense, another opportunity at saying a final farewell, or simply by providing a sense 
o f continued closeness preserved by the memory o f the person and their typical 
dispositions. It is not at all clear that situationism can provide such emotionally 
important kinds o f relief. Indeed, it appears that here, as in the last example, 
situationist concerns are entirely out o f place, while character styled thought 
processes remain positively meaningful and importantly involved in helping 
individuals to navigate through the trials and tribulations o f life in general.
No doubt, there remain a multitude of examples that could be developed 
wherein character thoughts are shown to be of great importance, to be highly valued, 
and to be also very useful to people generally. However, I think that the examples 
provided so far are sufficient to both encourage further exploration o f such potential 
examples, and more importantly, they are sufficient enough to raise serious doubts 
about both the reach of application of the social psychological data, as well as the 
soundness o f the situationist suggestion to abandon the notion o f character. Therefore, 
I will end my development o f such examples here. However, there remain some 
suggestions I would like to make to those who endorse a strong-situationist stance:
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primarily, it seems that the character eliminativist situationist ought to look more 
closely at just what exactly is involved in our conceptions o f character before making 
blanket statements to the effect that they should be abandoned. Indeed, the insights 
provided by conceptual blending theory seem to allow a far more comprehensive 
understanding in regards to the ways we think about character and employ character 
terms, than the mere behavioural data gathered by the social psychological 
experiments referenced by situationists— data that ultimately is o f limited relevance 
to the ways in which we employ the concept o f character.
Moreover, what seems to be commonly overlooked by situationists, when it 
comes to character, is both that it is a process of development— one that, to study 
honestly, would require a comprehensive assessment o f many behaviours over a long 
period o f time; and further, that it is, in many important ways, thoroughly entrenched 
in our modes o f thinking about ourselves and others. Furthermore, many o f these 
types of character thoughts do lead to positive and useful results; that is, they are not, 
as Harman seems to think, all predicated on error. Perhaps, instead of 
characterological thinking being the result o f a certain confirmation bias (as Harman 
suggests), it is the strong-situationist position that is guilty o f  resulting from such a 
bias, since obvious examples o f the value and usefulness of character thoughts can be 
found in the daily lives o f almost anyone; and more importantly, there does exist 
empirical data to support the idea that certain aspects o f character are in fact quite 
consistent (e.g. Bern’s [1983] template matching research).
The next section o f this thesis is an attempt to address the sense in which 
character might be said to be real or to exist. By drawing on ideas from Daniel
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Dennett, it will be shown that while character may not have the kind o f possessed by 
a physical object, the ascription of character is grounded in reality. Character can be 
defined in many different ways. The message to be drawn from the next section is 
that character conceptions should be understood as useful, empirically grounded 
interpretations o f behaviour, and that to argue that one kind o f conceptualization of 
character is problematic (i.e. not supported by the evidence), is by no means to argue 
that they must therefore all suffer from the same weaknesses.
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4.0 The Construct of Character: A Direction for Future Work
Daniel Dennett, in his “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” draws the 
analogy that a ‘se lf  is a lot like the concept of the centre o f gravity o f an object 
within Newtonian physics. Just as a centre of gravity is not identical with any 
particular atom of an object, neither is a self identical with any particular neuron (or 
packet of neurons), in the brain. Rather, they are both concepts that can prove to be 
quite useful in their respective domains o f interest and application. It appears to me, 
that understanding character in a similar light would prove informative and helpful 
with respect to addressing an underlying issue within the debate over personality and 
character—mainly, as concerns how character is defined in particular cases and 
studies, and the adequacy of such definitions to capture the multifarious ways in 
which the concept o f character is understood and employed generally. However, in 
order to appreciate what implications Dennett’s ideas may have for character, one 
must first understand his analogical reasoning.
According to Dennett, a centre o f gravity, “has a nicely defined, well 
delineated and well behaved role within physics” (1992, p. 103). And although a self 
may be far more complex than a centre o f gravity, both concepts are commonly 
known and deeply involved in how we live our day-to-day lives. With respect to our 
everyday recognition and dealings with the centres o f gravity o f various objects, for 
example, we place dinner plates near the middle o f tables rather than leave them 
hanging off o f their edges because we know that if  the centre o f gravity o f the plate is 
not fully supported by the table then the plate will fall over and we will have a mess
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to clean. We make book shelves level in order to properly support books and keep 
them from sliding off based upon our understanding of their centres o f gravity, and 
we stay upright while riding a bicycle by keeping our centre o f gravity adjusted to the 
appropriate position over the middle of the seat. We can manipulate an object’s centre 
o f gravity as well as our own, for example, by holding a weighted pole as a tightrope 
walker does— which has the effect o f lowering one’s centre o f gravity to make one’s 
balance more sure footed. But when we change the centre o f gravity o f an object, the 
centre o f gravity itself does not traverse all o f the intermediate positions between its 
initial position and its modified one. Rather, because it is an abstraction and not a 
tangible physical entity, it only represents one exact location at any point in time, and 
its shifting from one position to another is not restricted by ordinary physical means, 
for example, as a falling air borne rock’s movement would be restricted by landing in 
a tar pit. Indeed, the only properties that a centre o f gravity shares with other objects 
in the physical world is that it has a “spatio-temporal location”, but as was mentioned, 
it can never be identical to the material object that shares it’s location, for to think so 
would be, as Dennett points out, to make a category mistake. To say that the centre of 
gravity is not identical to the physical object is not to say that it is not empirically 
grounded, for it figures in predictions and explanations. The concept o f the centre of 
gravity of an object is a widely employed, robust, and deeply useful— not unlike the 
notion of the self, as Dennett understands it.
For Dennett, while a self is real, it does not possess the same type of reality as 
say, a person’s body (1992, p. 105). And in a manner similar to how a physicist posits 
a centre of gravity to explain and predict the behaviour of certain objects, so too for
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the psychologist and philosopher is it, “theoretically perspicuous to organize the 
interpretation” around the central idea o f the self o f a human being (1992, p. 105). It 
is this kind o f unified focal point regarding a person that bears a resemblance to how 
we understand the individual in terms of character types. Moreover, it would seem, as 
Dennett asserts regarding centres of gravity and selves, that conceptions o f character, 
“have only the properties that the theory that constitutes them endowed them with” 
(1992, p. 106). That is to say that, for example, within a given theory or study of 
character or personality, there exists a specific set o f operational definitions— and 
these should act to constrain how theorists (including situationists) extrapolate from 
the data in order to make more broad generalizations concerning character. In other 
words, one’s freedom to make inferences about character in general should be deeply 
modeled on and shaped by the limits and allowances o f the theory one is drawing 
from. Athanassoulis (2000) seems to have picked up on this line o f thought by 
assessing the actual aims and ambitions o f several o f the studies often cited by 
situationists, and by arguing that their experimental designs typically do not warrant 
the kinds o f extrapolations and generalizations commonly made by situationists. So 
what philosophers and other researchers need to keep in mind is that character and 
personality may be operationally defined in a number of different ways, and that not 
all operational definitions provide the same license to generalize, or warrant, for 
situationist conclusions.
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4.1 Experimental Constructs and Common Understandings
Operational definitions o f character need to be checked against common 
understandings o f character, since incompatibility at this level may seriously restrict 
the application of findings to a more general class. For example, according to Bern, “a 
sample of individuals is [deemed] inconsistent to the degree that their behaviors do 
not sort into the equivalence class that the investigator necessarily imposes when he 
or she selects the behaviors and situations to sample” (1982, p. 213-214). The 
selected behaviours and situations to be studied play an important role in shaping how 
character or personality is understood and defined within the experimental context. 
But all too often, these selections, and the experimental designs that encompass them, 
result in a sort o f bottleneck effect wherein the operational understanding o f what it 
takes to have a consistent character is seriously restricted, and fails to incorporate the 
multiple bits o f information that typically go into common character descriptions— 
that is, where the individuals providing the descriptions of others know them 
sufficiently well. Moreover, it seems that within most of the studies cited by 
situationists, only group dimensions seem to be given any regard. These and other 
reasons have led Bern to suggest that, “consistency and inconsistency are not intrinsic 
properties o f behavior, but are judgments by an observer about the match between the 
behaviors and his or her category system.” (1982, p. 214). And these categories, for 
the most part, fail to do justice to the kinds o f individual patterns o f behaviour that are 
relevant to robust character types. Whether we recognize cross-situational 
consistencies in behaviour will depend on both (a) the patterns o f behaviour in the
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world and (b) the background theory applied to the interpretation o f that behaviour. 
Failing empirically to recognize a coherent, relatively stable pattern in an individual’s 
actions—particularly those that are relevant to a certain character type— does not 
necessarily signal the individual’s lack o f such behavioural regularities. Rather, it 
may simply be the case that our general theoretical constmctions are inadequate to the 
task o f revealing that idiosyncratic regularities are at work in real world behaviour. 
Thus, our research designs and operational definitions o f character should take their 
lead from the patterns o f behaviour we might observe someone to display in less 
controlled environments. And these research programs should be tailored more 
closely to individual assessments as opposed to group scores.
According to Bern, in contrast to the pre-established criteria o f character 
typically devised by researchers, it is personal observances within natural contexts, 
rather, that guide our normal descriptions of those we know well. He suggests that 
when describing a friend, “we do not evoke some a priori set o f fixed dimensions that 
we apply to everyone. [But] rather, we peek at the data first. That is, we first review 
the individual’s behavior and then select a small subset of descriptors that strike us as 
pertinent precisely because they seem to conform to the patterning o f the individual’s 
behaviour” (1982, p. 214). So normally, we do not evaluate those we know well by 
generating a strictly defined trait term and then disqualifying the person from such a 
class for having failed to behave accordingly in various circumstances. Rather, we 
seek out the regularities that we are aware o f in the individual’s behaviour and only 
then do we attempt to relate these findings to a particular type o f character—the one 
that fits most effortlessly with the identified regularities.
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Moreover, according to Bern, there are various conceptual ‘prototypes’ of 
character that serve to remedy apparent incongruities in observed behaviour—that is, 
once the right prototype has been aligned with the person in the appropriate way. 
(Notice the similarity between these prototypes and the generic spaces for types of 
people in blend theory mentioned in section 3.3). For example, after having been 
invited backstage at a concert, one may come to find out that the members o f one’s 
favorite rock band, while uninhibited and full of energy during performances, are 
actually quite reserved while not on stage. And though this may at first seem bizarre, 
once one constructs or identifies the appropriate conceptual prototype to make sense 
of these observations, one’s confusion subsides. Or according to Bern, “When that 
prototype occurs to them, then the concept-attainment task has been solved, and their 
initial, provisional verdict o f inconsistency evaporates” (1982, p. 215). So it seems 
that in general, we first look for patterns and prototypes to explain the behaviours of 
others; we do this before we are willing to admit that a person is unpredictable or 
behaviourally inconsistent— and we will only admit that they are inconsistent after 
attempts to find a suitable pattern or prototype have failed us. That is not to say that 
we should resist concluding that an individual is behaviourally inconsistent— on the 
contrary, where encountered, the evidence should be acknowledged— but rather, that 
we generally look for patterns before admitting a person’s behaviour to be disordered. 
And furthermore, we should keep in mind that in some cases where conclusions of 
inconsistency are made, the result may be due to a theoretical construct’s having 
allotted too narrow a range o f pattern recognition. Therefore, in some cases, even
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where we seem to arrive at the result of inconsistency, there may actually be present a 
more broad underlying consistency that we have simply yet to notice.
To reiterate the core points of this section: character, like Dennett’s 
understanding o f the self, is an empirically grounded way o f interpreting a being or 
entity. And because theorists and researchers employ specific operational definitions 
of character or personality within their work, we would do well to understand just 
what these definitions are— and perhaps more importantly, what they seem to leave 
out of the evaluation. Granted, the situationist perspective relies primarily upon the 
notion that character relevant displays of behaviour must follow the appropriate 
eliciting conditions, and such a demand at first glance appears reasonable. However, 
what remains unreasonable about the situationist position is that an aggregate of 
single instances o f behaviour (i.e. the results o f separate single experiments with 
different participants) is treated as confirming the view that an individual is typically 
behaviourally inconsistent. Indeed, upon closer inspection o f the primary 
experimental examples employed by situationists (those discussed within this thesis), 
we find no reason to accept the situationist suggestion for the elimination o f 
character, since they have not taken pains to even attempt to observe any individual’s 
character relevant behaviours over time (be they consistent or not), but instead, have 
merely evaluated behaviours from a number of single and separate instances against 
far too strict and unforgiving a definition of character. What is yet to be done, and 
what is necessary in order to conclude with confidence that character (at least the 
situationist version o f it) either exists empirically or does not, as has been said, is to 
study the same individuals over repeated trials. This suggestion is o f primary concern
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to the resolution o f the debate on character, and any future research would do well to 
take notice o f its importance to both moral character theory and personality 
psychology.
4.2 Summary
In this thesis, I have attempted to cast doubt upon situationism’s character 
eliminativist project by both reviewing several powerful challenges to the situationist 
position and by contributing a challenge o f my own. The first set o f challenges to 
situationism (chapter two) provided several direct critiques o f the situationist project, 
while my own contribution (chapter three) shifted the focus o f the debate from the 
question o f the existence o f character to an examination o f the usefulness o f the 
concept.
In chapter one, I provided a detailed review o f three popularly cited 
experiments from social psychology. Situationists take these three experiments to be a 
compelling reason to adopt the situationist stance as well as to be representative of 
trends detected in a much larger body of experimental research. These experiments 
were: the Isen and Levin study concerning mood effects on helping behaviour; the 
Darley and Batson study regarding time-stress effects on helping behaviour, and the 
Milgram study on obedience. Both Doris and Harman took these experiments to 
suggest that people are typically inconsistent in their behaviours across situations.
This is a finding that they believe seriously undermines the traditional Aristotelian 
notion of character (as well as many versions o f virtue theory) since it does not agree
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with the idea o f ‘robust’ or ‘global’ character traits. Moreover, they believe that 
situationism can better explain certain (disturbing) world events, such as, the 
behaviour o f many German (Nazi) doctors during the Second World War (why they 
killed instead of cured), and other group struggles for superiority. It was also revealed 
that in some cases, situationist interpretations can be more explanatorily powerful 
than characterological conceptions. For example, with respect to the variants o f the 
Milgram experiment— wherein slight changes to the experimental setting or mode o f 
interaction between the participant and the experimenter produced striking 
differences in the degree of obedience obtained—the situationist approach appears to 
provide a plausible explanation. Character conceptions are more or less at a loss to 
explain the behavioural variation.
Nonetheless, in chapter two, it was argued that the situationists had drawn 
conclusions about character that extended far beyond what was warranted by the 
social psychological data. Indeed, not only did the situationist interpretations appear 
to motivate far too ambitious a view of the elimination of character, but other 
interpretations o f the social psychological data were shown to be available, and many 
of these seemed to provide a much more reasonable view in regards to the reach of 
the implications o f the experimental results. These alternative views and critiques of 
the situationist position revealed several o f the stance’s inadequacies and erroneous 
assumptions. One of the false assumptions o f the situationist position was that virtue 
theory takes the virtuous character type to be very common, when this is, in fact, not 
the case. Therefore, even if  a majority o f the people studied appeared to be 
behaviourally inconsistent across situations, this finding alone would not necessarily
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weigh very heavily against virtue theory, so long as there are some people who 
remained relatively consistent. Furthermore, with respect to behavioural consistency, 
it was argued that it is unreasonable for situationists to assume that there must be a 
perfect record o f conformity between the eliciting conditions deemed appropriate to 
certain character types (or traits), and the kinds of behaviours they are supposed to 
evoke. The reason such an argument was raised is that neither virtue theory nor 
common understandings o f character adopt such a strict view. Moreover, even though 
under the pressure o f the experimental setting some might fail to produce the desired 
behaviour, character notions could still be important factors in explaining the more 
ordinary daily behaviours o f people.
In chapter two it was also revealed that the conception o f character that the 
situationists employed did not adequately capture the richness o f the concept as it is 
understood in virtue theory (or commonly for that matter). The situationist view 
failed to account for the practical reasoning o f the individual and her subjective 
construal or perception o f the situation. Clearly, the type of research employed by 
situationists would need to be much more sophisticated if  they wished to address the 
more complete image o f character (i.e. one that includes the capacity for reason) 
described by Aristotle, and more recently argued for by philosophers like Kamtekar 
and Sreenivasan. Also, in chapter two, it was shown that situationist concerns could 
be easily absorbed by current character and virtue theories by way o f understanding 
the situational pressures as mere motivational impediments for the thinking 
individual. Understood in such a light, situationist pressures would no longer pose a
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threat to the global notion of character; rather, they would simply be treated as 
additions to the domain o f known constraints upon character motivated action.
Nonetheless, the research employed by situationists was considered to be 
insufficient to warrant claims for the elimination o f the notion o f character. The main 
deficiency o f the studies cited by situationists is that they did not track the behaviours 
o f participants over long periods o f time but merely studied single instances of 
behaviour. This flaw— that none of the popularly cited studies were longitudinal—  
was shown to be a major concern for situationists, since without such research their 
claims about the nonexistence o f character remain, in an important way, unsupported. 
Furthermore, it was noted, that even if such research existed (and was supportive o f 
situationist views), virtue theorists and character advocates could still argue that the 
participants were not well trained in how to be virtuous or how to develop the 
appropriate character types or traits. Thus, it was argued that the general descriptive 
findings o f social psychological research do not define the upper limit o f human 
potential. It could well be the case that proper character training is all that is required 
to increase a person’s behavioural consistency rating across situations.
It was also shown (in chapter two) that there is in fact some empirical support 
for the notion of character. Both locally in terms o f fairly specific traits, and globally, 
as was seen with regards to Bern’s template matching technique. Furthermore, it was 
argued that the debate over the existence of global character traits could be brought 
closer to a reasonable resolution if  more carefully designed studies were produced, 
and further, that if  such studies are going to prove more useful than those currently 
available, they must adopt a longitudinal methodology. It is only with reference to
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such work that the situationist position could directly challenge the notion of global 
character traits. However, as argued in chapter three, even if  the situationists were to 
take the necessary pains to acquire the appropriate support for their eliminativist 
position with respect to global character traits (assuming the relevant research turns 
out to be in their favour), I argued, that we may still want to retain the notion of 
character for the many benefits it offers to individuals (both as a collective and as 
concerns the individual proper).
Chapter three began with an introduction to Fauconnier and Turner’s mental 
space mapping theory, known as conceptual blending. It was suggested that retraining 
the problem o f the existence of global character to one in which its retention 
depended upon its usefulness in contexts where prediction was not the only concern 
was a novel way in which to challenge the situationist position. First, I described the 
component parts and different types of conceptual blends, before explaining how such 
blends are involved in the ways that we think about ourselves and others. Through an 
analysis o f how blends are related to our thoughts about character and identity, I was 
able to show that the concept o f character is much more than a tool for behavioural 
predictions. Indeed, I argued that there are many important ways in which character 
type thoughts are deeply useful in promoting things like social cohesion through 
empathy, a greater understanding o f self and personal growth by way o f providing a 
coherent unity to one’s sense o f identity, and emotional relief in times o f grieving 
(among other advantages the character thoughts may provide). Furthermore, it was 
shown (in chapter three) that situationist concerns or warnings were, for the most 
part, either out o f place or irrelevant to the processes and products o f most o f the
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examples o f blends involving character thoughts. Therefore, the limited scope of 
application of situationist views was partially conveyed.
Finally, I suggested (in chapter four) that Daniel Dennett’s views on the self 
were important to how we should understand the notion o f character. It was argued 
that the concept o f character may be defined in many different ways and that these 
definitions did not all provide the same warrant for situationist conclusions. Indeed, 
how one extrapolates from the social psychological data to more general views about 
character and virtue was shown to be an area o f concern for both situationists and 
advocates o f character and virtue alike. In other words, to make the leap from the 
social psychological data to generating inferences about character in general requires 
both a careful scrutiny o f the data and a carefully reasoned argument about the 
implications o f that data. Moreover, these inferential leaps ought to be given greater 
attention by theorists on both sides o f the debate. Ultimately, I agreed with Dennett’s 
treatment o f the self and suggested that character be understood in a similar way.
Again, the situationists have argued beyond the reach o f the experimental 
data. What they need to obtain greater support for their position is longitudinal 
research with favorable findings (however unlikely that may be). However, even if  
such research found in favour o f situationism with respect to global traits, we may 
still want to retain the notion o f character for the many ways in which it remains 
useful to us and beneficial to many cognitive processes and social relationships.
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